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I. INTRODUCTION

Consider a case in which a young professional is accused of
embezzling funds from her employer. The accused vehemently asserts
her innocence and is attempting to develop the strongest possible defense
for her upcoming trial. As part of her defense, she may be tempted to
introduce testimony from a long-time friend or colleague that describes
her honest character and reputation for integrity. This character evidence
could suggest to jurors that embezzlement is not consistent with the
defendant's personality, and she would be unlikely to engage in such acts,
potentially leading them to have doubts about her guilt.
Although the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) contain a general
prohibition against introducing evidence of character for the purpose of
propensity inferences,' FRE 404(a)(2)(A) provides an exception for
defendants in criminal trials. 2 Criminal defendants are allowed to
introduce evidence of their good character to suggest that they are not the
sort of person who would commit a particular crime. Defense character
testimony is limited to the discussion of traits and dispositions that are
deemed pertinent to the crime in question, 3 and it must be given in the
form of broad statements about the witness's opinion of the defendant or
the defendant's reputation in the community.4
The "good character" exception is framed as an advantage for
defendants in criminal trials, providing them an extra means of defending
themselves against the greater evidentiary power of the state.5 But is the
exception truly likely to benefit defendants? Consider the rest of the rules
that govern this testimony. Not surprisingly, if a defendant elects to
1. FED. R. EvID. 404(a)(1) states "Evidence of a person's character or character trait is not
admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character
or trait."
2. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(A).
3. Id.; FED. R. EvID. 404 advisory committee's notes (2011).
4. See FED. R. EVID. 405(a).
5. See FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's notes (2011); see also H. Richard Uviller,
Evidence of Characterto Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice in the Courtroom, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 842 (1982).
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introduce character evidence, the prosecution is allowed to rebut it. 6
Under FRE 405(a), rebuttal may take the form of cross-examination
about the defendant's negative actions.7 In our embezzlement example,
the prosecutor might ask the character witness whether he has heard that
the defendant created a fake ID and used it to purchase alcohol and get
into bars while she was underage. These cross-examination questions are
intended to impeach the credibility of the character witness by suggesting
that he does not know the defendant well or is not a good judge of
character. However, it is highly unlikely that jurors use crossexamination evidence solely to make judgments of the character
witness's credibility, as the Federal Rules intend. Instead, jurors are likely
to extend their use of cross-examination to judgments about the
defendant's character and/or guilt.8 If jurors misuse negative acts learned
through cross-examination in this manner, the ability to introduce
character evidence shifts from an ostensible advantage to a threat to a
defendant's right to a fair trial. This concern might be mitigated if jurors
who are exposed to negative rebuttal information are consistently given
clear, understandable instructions about the permissible uses of that
information. In many cases, though, jurors may not receive limiting
instructions for character evidence. Even if they do, a considerable body
of research casts doubt on jurors' ability to understand and follow
limiting instructions when make trial judgments.9
Over the years, character evidence has been the source of a
considerable number of criminal appeals,1 0 and many critical analyses of
the Federal Rules for character evidence have been written." Legal
scholarship on character evidence has addressed a number of important
issues, including the psychological rationale for using personality to
predict (or post-dict) behavior,1 2 concerns about introducing evidence of
6.

FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(A).

7. See FED. R. EVID. 405(a).
8. Jennifer S. Hunt & Thomas Lee Budesheim, How Jurors Use and Misuse Character
Evidence, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 347, 352-58 (2004); Evelyn M. Maeder & Jennifer S. Hunt,
Talking about a Black Man: The Influence ofDefendant and CharacterWitness Race on Jurors'
Use ofCharacterEvidence, 29 BEHAv. SCI. LAW 608, 613-14 (2011); Josephine Ross, "He Looks
Guilty": Reforming Good CharacterEvidence to Undercut the Presumptionof Guilt, 65 U. PITT.

L. REV. 227, 242-46 (2004).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 145-80.
10. Edward J. lmwinkelried, The Use ofEvidence ofan Accused's UnchargedMisconduct
to Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines which Threaten to Engulfthe CharacterEvidence Prohibition,

51 OMo ST. L.J. 575, 577 (1990). See also Margaret A. Beck, Emerging Clinical Research
Demonstrates the Importance of Adhering to Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Defendants

Convicted of Possession of Child Pornography, 27 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 161, 168 (2016).
11. See infra Part II for a review.
12. See generally Jonathan D. Kurland, Characteras a Process in Judgment and DecisionMaking and its Implicationsfor the CharacterEvidence Prohibitionin Anglo-American Law, 38
LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 135, 143-51 (2013-2014); Miguel A. Mendez, The Law ofEvidence and
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a defendant's past behaviors and convictions for ostensibly non-character
purposes under FRE 404(b),1 3 and the use of character evidence in
particular types of cases, such as cases involving alleged sexual assault
molestation,1 4 self-defense,'" or preventative detention,16 and cases tried
in military courts. 17 However, there has been little scholarly attention
given to the good character exception, including critical analysis of the
balance between defense and prosecution evidence established in FRE
405(a) and the possibility that jurors may misuse negative acts
information from cross-examination to judge the defendant.' 8 Notably,
these issues have been empirically examined in the psychological
literature on juror decision-making, but to date this research has not been
used to inform the legal scholarship on character evidence.
In this Article, I address these gaps through a critical examination of
jurors' use of evidence introduced under the good character exception
that integrates both legal and psychological scholarship. I also present a
comprehensive analysis of state and federal pattern jury instructions for
the Search for a Stable Personality, 45 EMORY L.J. 221, 226-34 (1996); Miguel A. Mendez,
Character Evidence Reconsidered: "People do not Seem to be Predictable Characters," 49
HASTINGS L.J. 871, 877-81 (1998).
13. See, e.g., Andrew J. Morris, FederalRule of Evidence 404(b): The Fictitious Ban on
CharacterReasoningfrom Other Crime Evidence, 17 REV. LITIG. 181, 189-99 (1998); Chris
Chambers Goodman, The Color of our Character: Confronting the Racial Character of Rule

404(b) Evidence, 25 LAW & INEQ. 1, 2, 5-8 (2007).
14.

Much of this literature followed the controversial adoption of FRE 413, 414, and 415

in 1994, which allow evidence of similar acts to be introduced for any purpose for it is relevant in
criminal and civil sexual assault (FRE 413, 415) and child molestation (FRE 414, 415), cases.
See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelreid, Reshaping the Grotesque DoctrineofCharacterEvidence: The
Reform Implications of the Most Recent Psychological Research, 36 Sw. U. L. REV. 741, 744
(2008); Roger Park, Characterat the Crossroads, 49 HASTINGS LJ. 717, 730 (1998); Aviva A.
Orenstein, No Bad Men!: A FeministAnalysis ofCharacterEvidence in Rape Trials, 49 HASTINGS

L.J. 663, 689-90 (1998).
15. This literature focuses on FRE 404(a)(2)(B) and 404(a)(2)(C), which allow the defense
to introduce evidence of the alleged victim's character, for example to suggest that the victim
initiated aggressive behavior with the defendant. See, e.g., Colin Miller, Justice ofthe Peace: Why

FederalRule of Evidence 404(a)(2) (C) should be Repealed, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (2013);
Christopher W. Behan, When Turnabout is Fair Play: Character Evidence and Self-Defense in

Homicide andAssault Cases, 86 OR. L. REv. 733, 736-37 (2008).
16.

See, e.g., Ted Sampsell-Jones, Preventative Detention, CharacterEvidence, and the

New Criminal Law, 2010 UTAH L. REv. 723, 730-36 (2010).
17. See, e.g., Elizabeth Lutes Hillman, The Good Soldier Defense: CharacterEvidence and
Military Rank at Court Martial, 108 YALE L.J. 879, 883 (1999); Randall D. Katz & Lawrence D.
Sloan, In Defense of the Good Soldier Defense, 170 Mit. L. REV. 117, 121 (2001); Captain Rory
T. Thibault, "The Good Soldier Defense is Dead. Long Live the Good Soldier Defense ": The
Challenge ofEliminatingMilitary CharacterEvidence in Court Martials,2015-DEC ARMY LAW

19, 23-24.
18. For notable exceptions, see Ross, supra note 8, at 242-46; David Crump, An Edifice of
Misshapen Stones: InterpretingFederalRule 404(A), 43 HOFSTRA L. REv. 667, 672-73 (2015);
Goodman, supra note 13.
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character evidence to determine if they provide adequate protection
against its misuse. There are two central arguments in my overall
analysis. First, the structure for introducing evidence of good character
codified in the FRE is balanced in favor of the prosecution and, in fact,
provides a substantial disadvantage to criminal defendants because jurors
misuse negative acts information from cross-examination to judge the
defendant's guilt. Second, current jury instructions for character evidence
and its rebuttal do not ameliorate the problem because they frequently fail
to provide key pieces of information and are not written in a manner that
is easily comprehensible to lay people.
In Part II, I discuss the federal rules for introducing character evidence
in criminal trials and review legal scholarship on character evidence,
focusing on issues of relevance, structure, and balance. This part reveals
how an ostensible advantage for criminal defendants is structured so that
the balance is in favor of the prosecution. In Section III, I describe a
psychological framework for understanding how jurors are likely to be
affected by character evidence and its rebuttal. I then provide empirical
support for the argument that jurors misuse negative acts information
from cross-examination in ways that are harmful for defendants using
psychological research on jury decision making. In Part IV, I address the
potential role of jury instructions for improving jurors' use of character
evidence and reducing impermissible inferences, and present a content
analysis of the pattern instructions for character evidence and its crossexamination that are available in all state and federal circuit courts. This
analysis supports the second argument that current instructions for
character evidence are not likely to mitigate its misuse by jurors by
showing that these instructions often are not available, are not likely to
be easily understood, and do not provide adequate guidance. In Part V, I
argue that, given all of these problems, it is critical to reform the good
character exception to protect criminal defendants. I propose several
recommendations related to trial strategy, better provision of high quality
jury instructions, and changes to the current structure of character
evidence.
II. ADMISSIBILITY AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE

A. Admissibility of CharacterEvidence
Evidence about a criminal defendant's character is viewed with
19
suspicion under the Federal Rules of Evidence. According to FRE
19. In some cases (e.g., defamation cases), character is directly relevant to one or more
elements of a crime, defense, or claim and therefore is admissible. Fed. R. Evid. 404 advisory
committee's notes (2011). Cases in which character is "in issue" will not be specifically addressed
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404(a), "[e]vidence of a person's character or character trait is not
admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character or trait." 2 0 The "character evidence rule"
reflects concerns that testimony about behavioral propensity may be
unduly prejudicial, leading jurors to infer that a defendant is guilty of a
particular crime simply due to circumstantial evidence that he acted badly
in the past. 2 1 Despite this concern, there are numerous exceptions that
allow character evidence to be introduced in criminal trials. With notice
from the prosecution, evidence of a defendant's wrongful acts may be
admitted under FRE 404(b)(2) for a number of ostensibly non-character
purposes, including proof of motive, opportunity, knowledge, or
identity. 2 2 Under FRE 607-609, evidence about a defendant's character
for honesty as well as prior convictions can be admitted to attack the
credibility of his testimony. 2 3 FRE 413-415 allow evidence of similar acts
to be admitted for any relevant purpose in criminal and civil cases
involving sexual assault and child molestation. 2 4 Over time, the rule
against character evidence has degraded through a growing number of
exceptions and increased use at trial.2 5
The central arguments in this paper pertain to an exception provided
in FRE 404(a)(2)(A), which states that, in a criminal trial, "[a] defendant
may offer evidence of the defendant's pertinent trait, and if the evidence
is admitted, the prosecutor may offer evidence to rebut it." 2 6 In other
words, a criminal defendant is allowed to introduce character evidence to
suggest to jurors that he is not the sort of person who would commit the
crime in question. Although "pertinent" is ill-defined, character evidence
introduced by the defense must focus on traits that are related to the crime
in question; for example, a defendant accused of assault would be allowed
to offer testimony about his peaceful and gentle nature, but not his high
level of integrity.2 7
If a defendant elects to introduce character evidence, the form of that
in this Article because the defendant is less likely to have a meaningful choice about whether to
introduce character evidence. However, the general arguments about the structural imbalance
created by FRE 405 and jurors' misuse of character evidence cross-examination apply in this
situation as well.

20.

FED. R. Evn. 404(a).

21.

FED. R. Eva. 404 advisory committee's notes (1991); Michelson v. United States, 335

U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948).
22. Uviller refers to these exceptions as KIPPOMIA (knowledge, intent, preparation, plan,
opportunity, motive, identity, absence of mistake). Uviller, supra note 5, at 877.

23.

FED. R. EvaD. 607-09.

24.
25.

FED. R. Evin. 413-15.
Paul S. Milich, The DegradingCharacterRule in U.S. CriminalTrials, 47 GA. L. REV.

775, 776 (2013).
26. FED. R. EvID. 404(a)(2)(a).
27.

FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's notes (2011).
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testimony is dictated by FRE 405(a).28 Unless character is "in issue" in
the trial, testimony by a character witness for the defense must be given
in the form of general statements about the defendant's reputation or the
witness's personal opinion of the defendant. Generally, a character
witness is not allowed to support her testimony with examples of related
behaviors. 2 9 In contrast, FRE 405(a) allows the prosecution to crossexamine a character witness by asking about specific negative actions of
the defendant that appear to contradict her testimony.3 0 These questions
often take the form of "Have you heard?" questions (e.g., "Have you
heard that the defendant was charged with assault after starting a fistfight
at a bar?") that ostensibly are asked to challenge the character witness's
knowledge of the defendant and ability to judge character.31 Jurors are
supposed to use the information they obtain through cross-examination
to evaluate the credibility of the character witness, not to judge the
character or guilt of the defendant. However, the assumption that jurors
will restrict their use of cross-examination to judgments of the character
witness is, at best, dubious. Thus, defendants who choose to introduce
character evidence take the risk of "opening the door" for the prosecution
to discuss previous negative behaviors that otherwise would not have
been admissible at trial.
B. Legal Analysis of CharacterEvidence
The structure for character evidence established under common law
and codified in the Federal Rules has generated a great deal of case law
as well as legal scholarship. These analyses generally focus on three
intertwined issues. The first issue involves the basic question of whether
evidence of character should be considered relevant in criminal trials. The
second issue addresses whether the structure for the admissibility and
rebuttal of character evidence is appropriately balanced and fair to the
needs of various trial parties, especially criminal defendants. The third
issue, which has generated the least legal analysis, involves whether
jurors use character evidence in an appropriate manner. Each of these
issues will be discussed in turn.

28. FED. R. EvID. 405(a).
29. Specific acts testimony is allowed if character is "in issue," that is, is directly relevant
to a case. FED. R. EviD. 405(b). According to Uviller, some judges allow character witnesses to
provide examples of the defendant's actions in their testimony, at least for testimony about
character for honesty under FRE 608. H. Richard Uviller, Credence, Character, and the Rules of
Evidence: Seeing Through the Liar's Tale, 42 DuKE L.J. 776, 821 (1993) [hereinafter Uviller,
Credence].
30. FED. R. EvID. 405(a). Prosecutors also are allowed to rebut character evidence by

introduce their own character witnesses to testify about the defendant's bad character.
31. FED. R. EvID. 405 advisory committee's notes (2011).
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1. Is Character Evidence Relevant?
The basic question of whether evidence about a defendant's character
is relevant in a criminal trial has received considerable attention. My
review of this issue, however, will be kept brief, since it is the least central
to the arguments in this Article, which focus on how jurors use character
evidence, given its current structure.
Both courts and legislators have raised concerns about the ability of
character evidence to meet the balancing test of probative value to
potential for prejudice, confusion, or waste of time required under FRE
403.32 The Advisory Committee notes for FRE 404 explicitly recognize
that the use of character evidence to infer a defendant's propensity for
certain behaviors is circumstantial, raising the issue of relevancy. 33 In
Michelson v. United States, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
character evidence has probative value, but raised concerns about
"confusion of issues, unfair surprise, and undue prejudice." 34 Despite
these concerns, the use of character evidence in criminal trials has
persisted and expanded over the years. 35 In fact, the FRE Advisory
Committee asserted that, "the criminal rule is so deeply imbedded in our
jurisprudence as to assume almost constitutional proportions and to
override doubts of the basic relevancy of the evidence." 6
Several rationales have been offered for the many exceptions to FRE
404(a) that allow for the introduction of character evidence. Character
evidence may be a critical part of the defense of a person accused of a
crime. 37 Allowing a defendant to introduce evidence of good character
under FRE 404(a)(2)(A) may help ensure that jurors consider the case
with a presumption of innocence and give the defendant the benefit of the
doubt.3 8 It may help to humanize an alleged criminal and enable jurors to
identify with him or her. 39 Further, a defendant's ability to introduce
positive character evidence may help to balance inequities between his
likely resources and those of the state, providing him with a viable
32. FED. R. EvID. 403.
33. FED. R. EvID. 404 advisory committee's notes (2011). In fact, Rule 404 was amended
in 2006 so that circumstantial uses of character evidence would no longer be admissible in civil
cases. Id. However, given the higher stakes, character evidence remains admissible in criminal
cases. Further, when character is "in issue," its relevance is clear. Id.

34.

Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948).

35. See Milich, supra note 25, at 776-80. For more specific concerns, see supra notes
1213-16.

36.

FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's notes (2011).

37. See Crump, supra note 18, at 669-70; Ross, supra note 8, at 227-28, 254-68.
38. See Milich, supra note 25, at 791-97; Ross, supranote 8, at 256-58. Milich argues that
character evidence affects jurors' standards for evidence and reasonable doubt as well as their
concern about wrongfully convicting a defendant.

39.

Milich, supra note 25, at 791-97.
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strategy for defending his liberty.4 0 A different but related rationale
comes from David Leonard, who argued that, regardless of the its actual
value for fact-finding, character evidence serves a "cathartic function" by
allowing defendants to feel like the are able to tell their side of the story
and be better understood by jurors. This feeling of catharsis bolsters the
defendant's sense of the perceived legitimacy of the trial as well as its
outcome.
Other justifications for character evidence focus on fact-finders.
Daniel Blinka argued that jurors have a strong desire to gain a sense of
who a defendant is as a person, so that they have context for evaluating
other pieces of evidence.4 2 Jurors may, in fact, feel cheated or lack
confidence in their judgments if they are not provided with enough
information to craft a full story of the alleged events and the defendant.
Likewise, other scholars have argued that character evidence can provide
relevant information for jurors, particularly if it involves repeated or
unusual behaviors related to the crime at hand,4 3 and that jurors already
may infer information about a defendant's character from non-character
witnesses, including percipient witnesses and experts.4
Despite these arguments in favor of character evidence, concerns
about its use in criminal trials have been raised. A common critique
involves questions about the core assumption that knowledge about
personality is useful for predicting (or post-dicting) behavior. 45 In fact,
research in social and personality psychology reveals that broad
personality traits tend to be weakly associated with specific behaviors. 4 6
Most scholarship on this issue has rightly argued that it is more
appropriate to take a more complex, interactionalist approach which
recognizes that personality and situational influences jointly affect
behavior. 4 7 An interactionalist perspective suggests that character
40.
41.

FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's notes (2011); Uviller, supra note 5, at 855.
David P. Leonard, The Use of Characterto Prove Conduct: Rationality and Catharsis

in the Law ofEvidence, 58 U. COLO. L. REv 1, 3, 38-42 (1986-87). Notably, Leonard asserts that
character evidence has evidentiary value, despite psychological research that challenges the use

of personality to predict behavior.
42. See generally Daniel D. Blinka, Character, Liberalism, and the Protean Culture of
Evidence Law, 37 SEATTLE L. REv. 87 (2013). Blinka argues that jurors will infer character from
things like demeanor and background if necessary to get a sense of who the defendant is. Id. at

100-04, 113-15.
43.

Kenneth J. Melilli, The CharacterEvidence Rule Revisited, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1547,

1623 (1998); Uviller, supra note 5, at 884.
44. Ross, supra note 8, at 257-58. Crump, supra note 18, at 679.
45. See lmwinkelreid, supra note 14, at 741; Kurland, supra note 12, at 137, 144, 149;
Mendez, supra note 12, at 222-26; Park, supra note 14, at 722-28.
46. See Walter Mischel, Personalityand Assessment (1968).

47.

Notably, some legal scholars have argued that the legal conception of character is

broader than psychological concepts of dispositions or personality, and therefore, psychological
research has little bearing on arguments about the utility of character evidence. Blinka, supra note
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evidence may have utility for understanding a defendant's behavior, but
it requires more information than the broad statements about relevant
traits currently allowed under FRE 405(a). Debate about the implications
of psychological research on personality and behavior has made
important contributions to our understanding of character evidence, but
given its extensive coverage in the literature, this issue will not be
discussed further here.
2. Is the Structure of Character Evidence Appropriately
Balanced and Fair?
In arguably the most important judicial decision about character
evidence, Michelson, Justice Jackson described the common law rules for
character evidence as "archaic, paradoxical and full of compromises and
compensations by which an irrational advantage to one side is offset by a
poorly reasoned counter-privilege to the other." 48 However, he then
stated, "[t]o pull one misshapen stone out of the grotesque structure is
more likely simply to upset its present balance between adverse interests
than to establish a rational edifice." 4 9
This "grotesque" structure for character evidence became codified in
the FRE. Barring the exceptions in FRE 404(b), only the defense is
allowed to introduce evidence of the defendant's character,o but that
evidence is restricted to testimony about pertinent traits given in the form
of broad statements about a character witness's opinion or the reputation
of the defendant. 5 ' In contrast, the prosecution only can address character
traits that are first introduced by the defendant, but is allowed to rebut
them by asking about the defendant's specific, negative behaviors. 52
Not surprisingly, there has been considerable debate about this system
for character evidence. The argument for limiting character testimony to
general statements about reputation and opinion is that they are efficient
means of providing information about the defendant.53 Testimony about
a defendant's specific acts is likely to be more probative, but also has
greater potential for prejudice, is more time-consuming, and may lead to
"mini-trials" if facts are disputed.5 4 However, as noted by the Georgia
42, at 105-07, 147-48, 150-51; Melilli, supra note 43, at 1594-95.
48. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948).
49. Id.
50. FED. R. EvtD. 404(a)(2)(A).
51. FED. R. EvID. 405(a).
52.
53.

FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(A) and 405(b).
FED. R. EvID. 405 advisory committee's notes (2011). Crump recognizes these issues

and also argues that the lower relevance of character evidence adds to the argument for efficient
testimony. Crump, supra note 1818, at 670-72.
54. FED. R. EVID. 405 advisory committee's notes (2011). Specific acts testimony is
admissible if character is 'in issue.' Crump, supra note 18, at 671.
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Court of Appeals in Simpkins v. State, this argument causes "an
evidentiary anomaly that in proving general moral character, the law
prefers hearsay, rumor, and gossip, to personal knowledge of the
witness."5 5
Some commentators have argued for expanding character evidence to
allow witnesses to describe the specific acts of the defendant.5 6 Josephine
Ross proposed allowing character witnesses to testify about the
defendant's specific positive acts, as well as expanding the latitude for
"pertinent" character traits to give defendants more opportunity to tell
jurors about themselves. 57 Other scholars have suggested expansions of
specific acts testimony that would apply to prosecutors.5 ' For example,
H. Richard Uviller proposed a revised set of rules in which character
witnesses would be allowed to testify about their opinions of the
defendant and related behavioral patterns, but not about the defendant's
reputation or past convictions. 5 9 Under this proposal, character evidence
would be required to be highly specific, focus on repeated or unusual
behaviors, and restricted to circumstances that are comparable to the
crime in question.
In addition, there has been debate about the nature of character
evidence cross-examination. Some commentators have characterized the
current system as fair, suggesting that if defendants introduce character
evidence, jurors have the right to know if there is contradictory
evidence. 6 0 Echoing the reasoning of the Second Circuit in United States
v. Bah,6 1 David Crump strongly argued that cross-examination is
necessary to test the knowledge, judgment, and truthfulness of character
witnesses, and that prosecutors should be given considerable latitude for
such cross-examination. 6 2 In this view, the system of character evidence
is balanced because defendants' ability to decide whether or not to
introduce character evidence gives them the power to control jurors'
exposure to their prior bad acts. 63
A different position is taken by Ross, who argued that the asymmetry

55.

Simpkins v. State, 256 S.E.2d 65 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979).

56. See Ross, supra note 8, at 278; Goodman, supra note 13, at 45-47.
57. See Ross, supra note 8, at 278; Crump also argues for a liberal interpretation of
pertinent character traits. Crump, supra note 18, at 677--80.
58. Thomas J. Leach, "Propensity"Evidence and FRE 404: A ProposedAmended Rule
with an Accompanying "PlainEnglish" Jury Instruction, 68 TENN. L. REv. 825, 827 (2001);
Uviller, supra note 5, at 885-90; Melilli, supra note 43, at 1621-25.
59. Uviller, supra note 5, at 885-90. Leach offered a similar proposal, but would not allow
opinion testimony. Leach, supra note 58, at 865-66.
60. Crump, supra note 18, at 681-82, 688.

61.

United States v. Bah, 574 F.3d 106, 117-18 (2d Cir. 2009)

62.

Crump, supra note 18, at 672-75.

63.

Id. at 674-76.
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of FRE 405(a) shifts the balance against the defendant64 Any potential
benefits of introducing character evidence are likely to be eliminated
because pitting the weak forms of positive character testimony against
specific acts cross-examination makes jurors likely to receive more
negative than positive information about the defendant.6 5 Moreover,
cross-examination questions may include information about the
defendant which otherwise would not be admissible, providing a "back
door" to mention issues such as arrests that did not result in convictions. 6 6
Other commentators have suggested that unscrupulous prosecutors may
use character evidence cross-examination as a means of priming racial
stereotypes or references in cases involving minority defendants, for
example, evoking the image of the so-called "welfare queen" in a case
involving an African American woman. 6 7 Given these concerns, Ross
characterized the current system of character evidence as follows:
Good character evidence is like the children's party game where
the big present is but a tiny trinket wrapped within multiple layers
of boxes and wrapping paper. In contrast, the prosecution's
package appears smaller, but is filled with ammunition. The
current rules of good and bad character are not equal for
prosecution and defense, but the inequality slants in favor of the
prosecution. 6 8
3. Do Jurors Use Character Evidence Appropriately?: Legal Analyses
One implication of the assertion that the current system of character
evidence is balanced against defendants is that jurors may not use
character evidence-in particular, its cross-examination - in the intended
manner. 6 9 The purpose of cross-examining a character witness is to
challenge that person's knowledge of the defendant, ability to judge his
or her character, and/or truthfulness in testifying.70 In theory, the worstcase scenario for cross-examination--even cross-examination that
contains extremely negative or damaging information about a
defendant-should be that it negates any benefit provided by the original
character testimony and returns the defendant to the same position that he
would have been in had he not chosen to introduce character evidence.
64.

Ross, supra note 8, at 254-55.

65. Ross, supra note 8, at 242-46, 253-54, 271, 275.
66. Id. at 242-46. Ross proposed restricting character evidence cross-examination to
questions about the defendant's criminal convictions, as well as limiting exceptions to the
character evidence rule in FRE 404(b). Id. at 246, 278.
67.
68.

Goodman, supra note 13, at 5, 11-21.
Ross, supra note 8, at 254.

69.
70.

Id. at 250-54.
See Melilli, supra note 43, at 1577-78.
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The idea that cross-examination is "filled with ammunition"7 instead
implies that jurors may use information from cross-examination
questions in unintended ways, specifically, to make negative inferences
about the defendant's character and likelihood of committing the crime
in question.
Legal scholars have debated about whether jurors misuse character
evidence. A common concern is that jurors are likely to make character
inferences based on evidence about the defendant's past behaviors that
are admitted for ostensibly non-character purposes (e.g., motive,
knowledge) under FRE 404(b)(2). 7 2 The distinctions between permissible
non-character inferences and forbidden propensity inferences are often
minimal.7 3 For example, if evidence of previous bomb setting is
admissible under FRE 404(b)(2) to show that a defendant has the
knowledge to construct a bomb, the inference that he would have been
likely to act accordingly by setting a bomb on a particular occasion is
almost unavoidable, even though it is prohibited by FRE 404(b)(1). 74
Kenneth Melilli extended this argument to the misuse of character
evidence cross-examination, reasoning that, in order for crossexamination to have its intended effect of undermining a character
witness's credibility, jurors must accept the acts referenced in crossexamination questions as true. 7 1 Once negative information about a
defendant is accepted as true, jurors are unlikely to restrict their use of
that information to judgments of the character witness. 76 In fact, jurors
may consider such information highly relevant for determining the
defendant's guilt.7 7

A related argument involves the potential for jurors to "overvalue" or
give too much weight to character evidence.7 8 Jurors may be quick to
infer that prior negative actions of a defendant reflect a "bad"
personality,7 9 or to overestimate the likelihood that a defendant acted in

71.

Ross, supra note 8, at 254.

72.

See Blinka, supra note 42, at 110-12; Melilli, supra note 43, at 1554-55, 1574-76;

Ross, supra note 8, at 247; Uviller, supra note 5, at 879.

73. See Melilli, supra note 43, at 1554-55, 1558-64, 1574-76; Uviller, supra note 5, at
877-979.
74.
75.
76.

See Melilli, supra note 43, at 1554-55.
Id. at 1551-53.
Id. at 1552-53. He would eliminate cross-examination and rebuttal character witnesses,

but allow the prosecution to introduce character evidence. Id at 1621-26.
77.

See id. at 1552-54.

78.

Milich, supra note 25, at 782.

79.

See generally Imwinkelreid, supra note 14, at 759-61; Mendez, supra note 12, at 226-

29, 234-36; Park, supra note 14, at 720-41, (discussing how this argument has been raised
frequently with respect to FRE 413-415, which allow prior acts to be introduced in cases
involving sexual assault or child sexual abuse).

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

254

[Vol. 28

a manner consistent with a personality trait on a given occasion.8 0
Likewise, jurors may want to punish a defendant simply for being a "bad
person." 8 ' The overvaluation hypothesis is consistent with psychological
research on the fundamental attribution error, which occurs when people
overestimate the influence of personality and underestimate the influence
of the environment on behavior. 8 2 However, the claim that jurors
overvalue character evidence has been criticized by some legal scholars.83
One argument against this claim is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to
empirically assess the extent to which overvaluation occurs, at least in
actual trials. 84 Another criticism is that it is the jury's job as fact-finder to
determine the proper weight for character evidence, as o posed to
assuming that judges, attorneys, or other authorities know best. ' Further,
what appears to be overvaluation by jurors may reflect legitimate
inferences; for example, character testimony may provide context that
casts doubt on the credibility of other pieces of evidence. 8 6
When commentators do recognize the potential for the misuse or
overvaluation of character evidence, the most commonly proposed
remedy involves giving jurors limiting instructions about permissible and
impermissible uses of the evidence.8 7 However, this remedy is unlikely
to fully resolve concerns about the possible misuse or overuse of
character evidence; even proponents of limiting instructions for character
evidence acknowledge that such instructions are likely to be confusing to
jurors.8 8 I will return to this issue in Part IV, discussing in detail research
on jurors' understanding of judicial instructions, as well as the nature of
existing jury instructions for character evidence.
Concerns that jurors may misuse or overvalue character evidence
and/or its cross-examination are critical for assessing the current FRE
structure for character evidence, as well as how the decision to introduce
character evidence affects defendants' right to a fair trial. Unfortunately,
this issue has received relatively little scholarly attention compared to
other issues about character evidence. This lack of attention may reflect
the lack of empirical data demonstrating that problematic uses of
80. See Imwinkelreid, supra note 14, at 742; Kurland, supra note 12, at 143.
81. See Leonard, supra note 41, at 19-21; but compare Melilli, supra note 43, at 1605-08,
who is highly skeptical that jurors act to punish defendants for being "bad people."
82. See Daniel T. Gilbert & Patrick S. Malone, The Correspondence Bias, 117 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 21 (1995); LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION (1991).

83.
84.
85.
86.

See
See
See
See

Milich, supra note 25,
Melilli, supra note 43,
Melilli, supra note 43,
Milich, supra note 25,

at 782.
at 1600-01; Milich, supra note 25, at 782-84.
at 1600-01; Milich, supra note 25, at 782-84.
at 782-84.

87. See Leach, supra note 58, at 866-71; but compare Melilli, supra note 43, at 1573-82,
who argues that jury instructions are unlikely to help jurors understand the minimal distinctions
between permissible and impermissible uses of character evidence.
88. See Leach, supra note 58, at 866-71; Melilli, supra note 43, at 1573-82.

THE COST OF CHARACTER

2017]1

255

character evidence have the potential to influence trial outcomes.
Although it is true that one cannot retrospectively determine if character
evidence was misused or overvalued in a particular legal case, social
science experiments provide a method of empirically assessing jurors'
use of character evidence. In recent years, psychologists have articulated
a theoretical framework for understanding the influence of character
evidence in criminal trials and conducted several studies to test its effects
on mock jurors' judgments. This work, which provides insight into many
of the questions raised in this section, is discussed in the following section
HI. PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH ON JURORS' USE OF
CHARACTER EVIDENCE

A. PsychologicalFramework
There is a rich theoretical and empirical basis for developing a
psychological framework for understanding jurors' use of character
evidence. Several bodies of research are relevant to this inquiry, including
basic research on impression formation 89 and motivated judgments 90 and
applied research on juror decision-making91 and the effects of limiting
instructions. 92 Across these areas, hundreds of studies have been
conducted to empirically test predictions and develop and refine theories.
A psychological analysis of character evidence introduced under the
good character exception must start by addressing the imbalance in the
nature of the evidence allowed for the defense and prosecution under FRE
405(a). The defense must present evidence of the defendant's good
character in the form of general statements about the witness's opinion of
the defendant's traits or dispositions and/or the defendant's reputation in
the community for such having such traits. 93 In contrast, the prosecution
may cross-examine this testimony by asking questions about specific
negative acts of the defendant that run counter to his alleged disposition. 94
As a result, character evidence provided by the defense and prosecution
89. See Nicholas Epley & Adam Waytz, Mind Perception, in I HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 498 (Susan T. Fiske et al. 2010); James S. Uleman & Laura M. Kressel, A Brief
History of Theory and Research on Impression Formation, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
COGNITION 53 (Donal E. Carlston ed.).

90.

David Dunning, Motivated Cognitionin Selfand Social Thought, in I APA HANDBOOK

OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 777 (Eugene Borgida & John A. Bargh eds. 2015).

91.

Margaret Bull Kovera & Lora M. Levett, Jury DecisionMaking, in 2 APA HANDBOOK

OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 271 (Brian L. Cutler & Patricia A. Zapf eds. 2015).
92. Joel D. Lieberman, The Psychology ofJury Instructions, I JURY PSYCHOLOGY: SOCIAL
ASPECTS OF TRIAL PROCESSES 129 (Joel D. Lieberman & Daniel A. Krauss eds. 2009).

93.
94.

FED. R. EvID. 405(a).
Id.
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varies on two key dimensions: valence and specificity. A substantial body
of psychological research shows that negative information has a stronger
impact on impressions and judgments than does positive information. 9 5
Negative information is considered more diagnostic than positive
information;9 6 for example, when determining a person's aggressiveness,
a single act of violence may be considered more informative than years
of gentle behavior. In addition, there is evidence that, at least under
certain circumstances, specific information can have a stronger influence
on judgments than general information. 9 7 Of particular relevance to the
current analysis, mock jurors are more influenced by witnesses who
describe specific or concrete details than by witnesses who testify in more
general terms.9 8 Together, these findings suggest that the prosecution has
a double advantage under the current system of character evidence. The
defense must rely on positive, general testimony, which is likely to be
seen as relatively weak and thus may have little influence on jurors'
judgments of the defendant. 9 In contrast, the prosecution is allowed to
use negative, specific information, which is likely to be seen as much
more informative and therefore have a stronger impact on jurors.
Another part of the analysis involves the differential targets of
character testimony and its rebuttal. The defense's character evidence is
intended to be used by jurors to form an impression of the defendant and
to consider whether he or she seems like the sort of person who would be
likely to commit a particular crime. In contrast, the questions asked by
95. See Paul Rozin & Edward B. Royzman, Negativity Bias, Negativity Dominance, and
Contagion, 5 PERSONALITY Soc. PSYCHOL. REv. 296 (2001); John J. Skowronski & Donal E.
Carlston, Negativity and Extremity Biases in Impression Formation:A Review of Explanations,
105 PSYCHOL. BULL. 131 (1989).
96. Skowronski & Carlston, supra note 95, at 131. In fact, humans may have evolved to

have a heightened sensitivity to negative information because recognizing and avoiding
potentially dangerous persons and situations facilitates survival. Rozin & Royzman, supra note

95, at 314.
97. Brad E. Bell & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Trivial Persuasionin the Courtroom: The Power
of (a Few) Minor Details, 56 J. PERSONALITY Soc. PSYCHOL. 669 (1989).
98. Id. Likewise research shows that jurors are more influenced by confessions when they
include specific details than when they consist of more general admissions of guilt. Sara C.
Appleby et al., Police-induced Confessions: An EmpiricalAnalysis of their Content and Impact,
19 PSYCHOL. CRIME LAW 111, 122-23 (2013).

99. In fact, some research suggests that, in social contexts, when one person (source)
describes another person (target), perceivers may use that information primarily to judge the

&

source (e.g., forming a negative impression of the source if he says bad things about the target).
Robert S. Wyer et al., Person Memory and Judgment: Pragmatic Influences on Impressions
Formed in a Social Context, 66 J. PERSONALITY Soc. PSYCHOL. 254, 264-65 (1994). Hunt

Budesheim found that influence of character evidence on judgments of the defendant is partially
mediated (explained) by their impressions of the character witness; for example, jurors may infer
that a defendant must be a decent person if a kind, honest person is willing to testify on his behalf.
However, the content of character evidence also has direct effects on jurors' views of the

defendant. Hunt & Budesheim, supra note 8, at 353, 355-56.
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the prosecution in cross-examination are only supposed to be used to
judge the credibility of the character witness." This distinction is likely
to be counterintuitive and confusing to jurors. Further, even if jurors
understand how they are supposed to use each type of information, they
may not use it correctly. When people are motivated to make good
decisions (e.g., when the stakes are high, as they are in a criminal trial),
they try to use all information that seems relevant."o' Information about
the defendant's negative acts contained in cross-examination questions
may appear highly relevant to jurors, making them want to use that
information when deciding the defendant's guilt.' 0 2 This assertion
mirrors the consistent finding that evidence of criminal history or past
conviction leads to more negative impressions of the defendant and
higher guilt judgments, even if mock jurors are given limiting
instructions. 103 In addition to motivational factors, cognitive processes
may make it difficult for jurors to restrict their use of cross-examination
information to judgments of the character witness's credibility. 1
Suppressing or limiting the use of information is cognitively challenging
and requires considerable mental energy and focus to maintain.10 5 When
people's cognitive resources become taxed or they are distracted from
suppression efforts, there often is a rebound effect in which use of
forbidden information becomes higher than it would have been in the
absence of the suppression attempt. 1" In the jury context, psychological
research consistently shows that mock jurors are influenced by damaging
inadmissible evidence that they have been instructed to disregard, leading
to higher conviction rates. 107 Thus, even jurors who try not to use
character evidence cross-examination to judge a defendant may end up
100. FED. R. EVID. 405(a); FED. R. EvID. 405 advisory committee's notes (2011).
101. Ziva Kunda, The Casefor Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 481 (1990).
Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie Ardnt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions: Social
PsychologicalExplanationsfor the Failures ofInstructions to DisregardPretrialPublicity and
Other Inadmissible Evidence, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POt'Y L. 677, 678 (2000).
102. Lieberman & Ardnt, supra note 101, at 667-68.
103. Eg., Edith Greene & Mary Dodge, The Influence ofPriorRecord Evidence on Juror
Decision Making, 19 LAW HUM. BEH. 67 (1995); Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the
Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on
Guilt, 9 LAW HUM. BEH. 37 (1985); for a meta-analysis, see Dennis J. Devine & David E.
Caughlin, Do They Matter? A Meta-analytic Investigation ofIndividualCharacteristicsand Guilt
Judgments, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y L. 109 (2014).
104. Richard M. Wenzlaff & Daniel M. Wegner, Thought Suppression, 51 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 59, 62 (2000); Sadia Najmi, Thought Suppression, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
COGNITION 417 (Donal E. Carlston ed., 2013).
105. Wezlaff & Wegner, supra note 104; Najmi, supra note 104.

106.

Id at 62-64.

107. Lieberman & Ardnt, supra note 101, at 679; Nancy Steblay et al., The Impact on Juror
Verdicts of JudicialInstruction to DisregardInadmissible Evidence: A Meta-analysis, 30 LAW

HUM. BEH. 469,471 (2006).
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being influenced by that information if their cognitive resources become
overburdened or depleted over the course of a trial or deliberations.
Combining these lines of analysis, the current rules for character
evidence create a system in which the prosecution is able to use more
powerful information than is the defense, and jurors are likely to misuse
that powerful information to make inferences about the defendant's
character and/or guilt. This analysis suggests the troubling possibility that
the good character exception-ostensibly an advantage for defendantsmay do more harm than good. 10
B. Research on Mock Jurors' Use of CharacterEvidence
Empirical research on mock jurors' use of character evidence supports
each of the components of this analysis, as well as the overall conclusion
that introducing character evidence can be detrimental to defendants.
These studies use experimental methods to examine the effects of
character evidence on mock jurors' judgments. Mock jurors' 09 read
transcripts or summaries of criminal trials, then render verdicts and make
other judgments (e.g., ratings of their impressions of the defendant). All
aspects of the trial are held constant other than the character evidence,
which is manipulated across conditions." 0 Any differences in verdicts
across conditions therefore must be caused by the differences in the
character evidence presented."'
Early studies on character evidence provided support for individual
components of the psychological analysis. Negative character evidence
had a more powerful influence on mock jurors' judgments than did
positive character evidence,' 12 and character evidence that referred to
specific acts had a stronger impact than did character evidence that was
limited to general statements about reputation." 3 My colleagues, Lee
108.

Hunt & Budesheim, supra note 8, at 358.

109.

Usually college students, although research shows that, in most cases, college student

mock jurors reach judgments that are similar to those of community samples. Brian H. Bornstein
et al., Mock JurorSampling Issues in Jury Simulation Research: A Meta-Analysis, 41 LAW HUM.
BEH. 13, 14,25 (2017).
110. WILLIAM R. SHADISH ET AL., EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR
GENERALIZED CAUSAL INFERENCE 1-32 (2002).

111. Id
112. Michael Lupfer et al., PresentingFavorable and Unfavorable CharacterEvidence to
Juries, 10 LAW PSYCHOL. REv. 59, 69-70 (1986); Sarah Tanford & Michelle Cox, Decision
Processes in Civil Cases: The Impact of Impeachment Evidence on Liability and Credibility

Judgments, 2 Soc. BEH. 165, 178 (1988). Notably, these effects were found for character evidence
in civil trials, which is no longer admissible. Another study found that negative character evidence
increased the influence of prosecution evidence that jurors otherwise found questionable
(testimony from a child witness). Bette L. Bottoms & Gail S. Goodman, PerceptionsofChildren's
Credibility in Sexual Assault Cases, 24 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 702, 725 (1994).
113. Eugene Borgida, CharacterProofand the Fireside Induction, 3 LAW HUM. BEH. 189,
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Budesheim and Evelyn Maeder, and I conducted the first studies that
integrated these components to provide comprehensive assessments of
the full impact of character evidence introduced by a criminal defendant.
Hunt and Budesheim conducted two studies, one involving an assault
trial and one involving a burglary trial, in which the ty e of character
evidence and rebuttal were systematically manipulated."1 4 A character
witness (the defendant's boss) testified about the defendant's positive
qualities (e.g., honesty, helpfulness) using general testimony (opinion
and reputation statements) or specific testimony (general testimony plus
examples of the defendant's positive behaviors).'"5 The character
evidence was either not rebutted by the prosecution, rebutted with crossexamination that included specific examples of the defendant's negative
actions, or rebutted with a contrary character witness who gave general
testimony that the defendant had negative qualities (e.g., was
untrustworthy).11 6 To provide a baseline, in a control condition, mock
jurors did not receive any character evidence.1 1 7 After reading the trial,
participants completed ratings of their impressions of the defendant,
beliefs about his guilt, and likelihood of voting to convict him." 8
Both studies revealed general character evidence (positive or
negative) had little effect on mock jurors' impressions of the defendant
or ratings of guilt or conviction. 11 9 Positive character testimony that
included examples of the defendant's behaviors significantly increased
his perceived trustworthiness and warmth, but did not affect guilt or
conviction ratings.120 However, cross-examination with the defendant's
negative actions made mock jurors' impressions more negative and
increased guilt and conviction ratings above baseline levels.121 In other
words, impressions of the defendant were more negative and guilt and
conviction ratings were higher when positive character evidence was
introduced and cross-examined with specific negative acts than when no
character evidence was given. 122 These findings support that argument
that juror are likely to misuse character evidence cross-examination in

190-91(1979).
114.

Hunt & Budesheim, supra note 8, at 350-51.

115.

We included conditions with specific positive acts to test ways of maximizing the

potential impact of positive character evidence. Id. Uviller found that many judges will allow
character witnesses to discuss specific positive acts, at least for testimony about character for
honesty admitted under FRE 608. Uviller, Credence, supranote 29, at 821.
116. Hunt & Budesheim, supra note 8.

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id
Id. at 350-51.
Id.
Id.
Id
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ways that harm criminal defendants.1 23
Two valid critiques of these studies are that they did not include jury
instructions and they used continuous rating scales to measure beliefs
about the defendant's guilt and likelihood of conviction. To address these
concerns, subsequent research by Maeder and Hunt 24 replicated these
studies, but provided participants with jury instructions for character
evidence and other important issues (e.g., elements of the charges) and
asked them to render categorical verdicts.1 25 Notably, neither of these
changes altered the pattern of results.1 2 6 Mock jurors who were given
instructions about the proper use of character evidence still misused
cross-examination information to judge the defendant, leading to an
increase in guilty verdicts.1 27
Maeder and Hunt also extended prior work by investigating whether
the influence of character evidence varied based on the race of the
defendant. 128 Legal commentators have suggested that positive character
evidence may be especially beneficial for defendants who are racial and
ethnic minorities, helping to counter jurors' preexisting stereotypes about
their groups. 129 Consistent with this analysis, psychological research
indicates that people often pay greater attention to stereotype-inconsistent
than stereotype-consistent information because it is seen as more novel
and revealing.1 30 Given this, we hypothesized that mock jurors would be
more influenced by positive character evidence in cases involving Black
defendants, who are the target of many negative stereotypes related to
criminality.131 In contrast, we predicted that negative character evidence
would have a stronger effect on judgments about White defendants, who
are likely to be seen in a more positive manner.
To test these predictions, we asked mock jurors to read a trial
involving assault and robbery charges. We manipulated the nature of the
character evidence (no character evidence; specific positive character
123.

Id.

124.
125.

Maeder & Hunt, supra note 8, at 612-13.
Id.

126.
127.
128.

Id. at 616.
Id
Id. at 617.

129. Ross, supra note 8, at 261-68. However, Goodman also suggests the potential for
character evidence to be used as a way to prime negative racial stereotypes. Chambers, supra note

13, at 5, 11-21.
130. Ap Dijksterhuis & Ad van Knippenberg, Trait Implications as a Moderator of
Stereotype-Consistentand Inconsistent Behaviors, 22 PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 425,

425, 430-31 (1996).
131. See, e.g., Kelly Welch, K. Black CriminalStereotypes and RacialProfiling, 23 J. CONT.
CRIM. JUST. 276 (2007); Susan T. Fiske & Courtney Tablante, Stereotyping: Processes and
Content, in 1 APA HANDBOOK OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: ATTITUDES AND

SOCIAL COGNITION 457, 480-81 (Mario Mikulincer et al. eds., 2015).
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evidence that was not rebutted;1 32 specific positive character evidence
with negative acts cross-examination). We also manipulated the race of
the defendant and character witness through the use of pictures and names
associated with Black or White individuals. The results of the study
supported our hypotheses. When character evidence was not presented,
the Black defendant was somewhat more likely to be convicted than was
the White defendant, reflecting general racial bias.' 33 Positive character
evidence reduced guilt judgments for the Black defendant, but did not
have a strong effect on the White defendant. In contrast, negative
character evidence had a much stronger impact on the White defendant
than the Black defendant. These findings suggest that, whether or not they
realize it, jurors may begin trials with preliminary impressions of
defendants based on racial stereotypes,1 34 the charges against them, 135 or
other factors. As a result, the same character evidence may be interpreted
or used differently,1 36 based on how it confirms or challenges those
In some cases, the cost-benefit analysis for
preexisting expectations.
introducing character evidence may vary based on the race of the
defendant; for example, the potential benefits of positive character
evidence may be greater and the risk of backlash from cross-examination
may be weaker for Black defendants than for White defendants, if the
content of the character evidence challenges damaging stereotypes about
Black Americans.
Overall, these studies provide empirical support for the argument that
the current structure of the good character exception for character
132. We included specific acts in the positive character testimony because general testimony
had such a weak effect in the Hunt & Budesheim study, supra note 8, at 352, 354-55.
133. For a review of racial bias in jury decision making, see Jennifer S. Hunt, Race,
Ethnicity, and Culture in Jury Decision Making, 11 ANN. REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 269 (2015)

134.

Id. at 273; Fiske & Tablante, supra note 131, at 462, 480-82.

135. Neil Vidmar, Generic Prejudice and the Presumption of Guilt in Sex Abuse Trials, 21
LAW HuM. BEH. 5, 6, 18 (1997); Richard Wiener et al., Generic Prejudice in the Law: Sexual
Assault and Homicide, 28 BASIC AND APP. SOC. PSYCHOL. 145, 145-46 (2006).
136. In addition, mock jurors' beliefs about character evidence are related to their beliefs

about the physical evidence in a trial. Jurors who report being strongly influenced by character
evidence fmd physical evidence to be less compelling and vice versa. Thus, character evidence
may have effects on trial judgments that extend beyond jurors' inferences about whether a
defendant is the sort of person who would commit a particular crime. Maeder & Hunt, supranote

8, at 615, 617.
137. In another study, we found evidence of a similar pattern in which character evidence
cross-examination involving negative qualities stereotypically associated with Black people
(aggressive, lazy, dishonest) had stronger effects on mock jurors' judgments of White defendants,

whereas cross-examination involving negative qualities stereotypically associated with White
people (materialistic, phony, selfish) had stronger effects on judgments of Black defendants.
Jennifer S. Hunt & Evelyn M. Maeder, "He's not like you think:" The powerful impact of
stereotype-inconsistent character evidence, at the International Congress on Psychology and Law,

in Miami FL.
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evidence is balanced in favor of the prosecution. Introducing positive
character evidence often provides little benefit to defendants, but it
creates the opportunity for a backlash effect in which jurors misuse
powerful information from cross-examination to judge the defendant in
addition to the character witness. As a result, defendants may be more
likely to be convicted when character evidence is introduced and rebutted
than when character evidence is not given. Moreover, the use of character
evidence and its rebuttal may be influenced by a defendant's race or other
protected identities, with greater weight being given to character evidence
that contradicts jurors' initial expectations about the defendant based on
group stereotypes. Further research may identify other contexts in which
character evidence has a relatively greater or weaker influence, but, given
the differential psychological impact of the information allowed to the
defense and prosecution, the underlying danger of negative acts crossexamination is likely to exist across cases. It has been said that defendants
who elect to introduce positive character evidence "open the door" to the
risks of cross-examination.1 38 However, a more apt metaphor may be that,
by introducing positive character evidence, the defense hands the
prosecution a loaded gun that can fire damaging information about a
defendant, causing wounds that potentially may lead to conviction.
IV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CHARACTER EVIDENCE

If positive character evidence often has a minimal effect on jurors, but
negative acts cross-examination is likely to be misused in ways that can
increase the likelihood of conviction, what can be done to help
defendants? The most common recommendation is to provide jurors with
clear and effective instructions about the proper use of character
evidence.1 39 According to this argument, ifjurors are instructed about the
purpose and intended uses of character evidence and its impeachment, as
well as inferences that are prohibited, they will be able to use it correctly.
Jury instructions may be an appealing solution for several reasons,
including low cost and relative ease of implementation. Indeed, they may
play a valuable role in challenging misconceptions about character
evidence. The general prohibition against propensity evidence exists
because of the concern that jurors will infer that a defendant who has
behaved badly in the past either must have committed the crime in
question or is a "bad person" who should be punished regardless of
guilt. 14 0 If jurors are not instructed about the proper use of character
138.
139.

Ross, supra note 8, at 242; Crump, supra note 18, at 680-83.
See Leach, supra note 58, at 866-71; but compare Melilli, supra note 43, at 1573-82.

140. FED. R. EVI. 404 advisory committee's notes (1991); Michelson v. United States, 335
U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948).
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evidence, they have little choice but to rely on these kinds of
commonsense intuitions about human behavior. 14 1 The need for
instructions is particularly important for cross-examination because
limiting the use of negative acts information to judgments of the character
witness's credibility is likely to fly against jurors' commonsense beliefs
and desire to consider all seemingly relevant information when
determining guilt.
However, there are several reasons to question the effectiveness of
jury instructions for addressing the problems of character evidence. Both
legal and social science analyses reveal that jury instructions commonly
are written in difficult-to-understand language and syntax, leading jurors
to be confused about their meaning and application. 42 Even when jurors
do understand instructions for character evidence, they may be motivated
to misuse certain information or cognitively unable to follow the
instructions.1 43 Maeder and Huntl 4 4 found that the backlash effect for
character evidence persisted even when participants were given jury
instructions; however, the study only included instructions from the State
of Nebraska, so it may be the case that other instructions would provide
better guidance.
These concerns underlie the second central argument of this article,
which is that jury instructions for character evidence are not likely to
prevent its misuse by jurors. To support this argument, I briefly review
research on jurors' often limited comprehension of jury instructions as
well as reforms designed to improve their understanding. Then, I present
an analysis of all pattern instructions related to the general use of
character evidence in criminal trials in state and federal courts. The
analysis examines (1) whether jurors are likely to receive instructions
related to character evidence, (2) whether those instructions provide
adequate information and guidance, and (3) whether they are given in a
manner that jurors are likely to understand. Finally, I summarize two
experiments that assess lay people's comprehension of jury instructions
for character evidence, which reveal important limitations to their
understanding.

141. Sara Gordon, Through the Eyes ofJurors: The Application of "PlainLanguage" Jury
Instructions, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 643, 646 (2013); Diamond et al., infra note 151, at 1575-76.
142. See, e.g., Nancy S. Marder, BringingJury Instructions into the Twenty-First Century,
81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 449, 489 (2006); Dumas, infra note 145; Lieberman, supra note 92;
Tiersma, infra note 145, at 721.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 99-108.
144. Maeder & Hunt, supra note 8, at 616.
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A. UnderstandingofJury Instructions:A BriefReview

'

Although courts generally presume that jurors comprehend the legal
instructions they are given,145 the clarity and decipherability of jury
instructions has long been a source of concern for legal scholars, social
scientists, and many individual judges.1 4 6 As summarized by Nancy
Marder, many jury "instructions use legal jargon or ambiguous language,
awkward grammatical constructions, and an organization that is difficult
to discern." 4 7 For example, jury instructions may use complex legal
terms such as "malice aforethought" without adequately defining them or
contain convoluted sentences that are difficult to parse.1 4 8 In addition,
pattern jury instructions, which are intended for broad usage across a
range of trials, often are written in abstract language, and jurors may be
unsure how to apply them to specific cases. 14 9 However, judges may be
hesitant to clarify the language of an instruction or draw connections
between abstract language and the case at hand for fear of being
overturned on appeal. 5 0 Exacerbating these problems is the fact that jury
instructions can be quite lengthy. A recent analysis of civil trials from the
Arizona Jury Project found that jurors received an average of seventeen
pages of instructions, with a range from thirteen to thirty-three pages.' 5
At the extreme end, jurors in the first trial of former Illinois Governor
Rod Blagojevich received over 100 pages of instructions.' 52 However,
despite their length, jury instructions often are presented orally by the
judge, and jurors may not receive a written copy for reference. 53
the presentation of jury instructions adds to their linguistic complexity
and conceptual difficulty, making them even more challenging to
understand.1 54

Not surprisingly, over the past forty years, a number of studies have
145. Judith L. Ritter, Your Lips are Moving ... But the Words Aren't Clear:Dissecting the
Presumptionthat Jurors UnderstandInstructions, 69 Mo. L. REV. 163, 169-70 (2004); Bethany
K. Dumas, Jury Trials: Lay Jurors, Pattern Jury Instructions, and Comprehension Issues, 67
TENN. L. REv. 701, 712 (2000); Peter Tiersma, The Rocky Road to Legal Reform: Improving the
Language ofJury Instructions,66 BROOK. L. REV. 1088 (2001).
146. See, e.g., Nancy S. Marder, BringingJury Instructions into the Twenty-First Century,
81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 449, 489 (2006); Dumas, supra note 145; Lieberman, supra note 92;
Tiersma, supra note 145 at 721.

147.
148.
149.
150.

Marder, supra note 146, at 454.
Tiersma, supra note 145, at I101-07, 1110-12.
Dumas, supra note 145, at 732-33.
Marder, supra note 146, at 459-60.

151. Shari Seidman Diamond et al., The "Kettleful of Law" in Real Jury Deliberations:
Successes, Failures, and Next Steps, 106 N.W.U. L. REV. 1537, 1548.
152. Monica Davey & Susan Saulny, JurorsFaultComplexity ofthe Blagojevich Trial, N.Y.

TIMES, Aug. 19, 2010.
153.
154.

Dumas, supra note 145, at 737-38; Marder, supra note 146, at 491.
Marder, supra note 146, at 490-97.
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demonstrated that jurors frequently fail to comprehend the instructions
they are given. 15 Research shows that, on average, jurors only
understand about 50%-70% of their instructions. 156 Comprehension is
even lower when instructions involve more complex concepts.1 57 For
difficulty
individuals have
example, even college-educated
the
concept
sentencing,
particularly
understanding instructions for capital
58
of mitigation.1 Further, lack of comprehension is associated with lower
quality trial judgments; for instance, jurors who do not understand
penalty phase instructions are significantly more likely to misidentify
aggravating and mitigating factors as well as make racially biased
sentencing decisions.1 59 Notably, limiting instructions may be especially
hard for jurors to understand and follow, and jurors may question the need
to exclude seemingly relevant evidence from consideration.1 60 A metaanalysis of forty-eight mock juror studies found that limiting instructions
reduced, but did not eliminate the impact of inadmissible evidence on
trial judgments.1 61
A recent analysis of civil trials in Arizona paints a more optimistic,
albeit complex picture of jurors' comprehension of instructions. 162 As
part of an evaluation of jury reforms, Shari Seidman Diamond and her
colleagues were able to record and analyze jury deliberations in fifty civil
trials.' 6 3 They coded over 13,500 statements made by jurors that were
related to the instructions they received.'64 Overall, they found that
approximately 79.2% of those statements were accurate, although there
was substantial variability in accuracy rates across trials.1 65 Confusion
due to the language used in the instructions caused 27.7% of those
errors. 166 In contrast, nearly three-fourths of errors stemmed from other
problems. Omission errors (56.9%) occurred when jurors were not
155. See Lieberman, supra note 92, at 131; Marder, supra note 146, at 454.
156. See Lieberman, supra note 92, at 131; Marder, supra note 146, at 454.
157. Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Clarifying Life and Death Matters: An Analysis of
Instructional Comprehension and Penalty Phase Closing Arguments, 21 LAw & HUM. BEHAV.
575, 577-79 (1997); Amy E. Smith & Craig Haney, Getting to the Point: Attempting to Improve
Juror Comprehension of CapitalPenalty Phase Instructions, 35 LAW & HuM. BEHAv. 339, 340

(2011).
158. Haney & Lynch, supra note 157; Smith & Haney, supra note 157.
159. Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Discrimination and Instructional Comprehension:
Guided Discretion, Racial Bias, and the Death Penalty, 24 LAW HUM. BEHAv. 337, 34748
(2000); Netta Shaked-Schroer et al., Reducing Racial Bias in the CapitalPhase ofCapital Trials,
26 BEHAV. Sci. LAW 603, 609-10 (2008).
160. Lieberman & Ardnt, supra note 101, at 678; Steblay et al., supra note 107, at 470.
161. Steblay et al., supra note 107, at 486-87.
162. Diamond et al., supra note 151, at 1546-48.

163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Id. at 1552.
Id. at 1556.
Id. at 1558.
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instructed about issues that they perceived as relevant (e.g., whether
insurance payouts were to be considered when making damage awards)
and therefore had to rely on commonsense beliefs or send questions to
the judge.1 67 Structural errors (15.4%) occurred when jurors did not grasp
the relationship between different components of piecemeal instructions
(e.g., how to combine claims).1 68 Across types of errors, jurors corrected
each other's mistakes a little less than half the time. 16 9 Based on these
data, Diamond and colleagues concluded that, at least in routine civil
trials, 7 0 jurors' understanding of instructions may be better than often
thought, with many errors being corrected through deliberation. Further,
improving juror comprehension requires more than plain English
revisions and better presentation; courts also must ensure that jury
instructions address commonsense misconceptions (e.g., about the use of
evidence or factors to be considered) and draw connections between
different instructions so that jurors can see how they work together. 17 1
Although empirical research on comprehension of juror instructions
has been criticized,1 72 this body of work, along with the experiences of
trial judges, has led several jurisdictions to attempt to revise their pattern
instructions using principles of "plain English" to make them easier to
understand.1 73 A notable example is the State of California, which
rewrote its civil and criminal instructions from scratch with the goals of
reducing or better explaining technical legal terminology and difficult
vocabulary and improving complex syntax (e.g., long, multi-clause
sentences).1 74 Research shows that these revised instructions improve
levels of comprehension, but, not surprisingly in light of Diamond et al.'s
findings,1 75 do not eliminate misunderstanding.1 76 For example, in a 2011
study, Smith and Haney assessed mock jurors' understanding of penalty
phase instructions for capital trials from the revised Judicial Council of
California Criminal Jury Instructions (CALCRIM) instructions compared
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 1558, 1575-85.
Id. at 1558, 1565-75.
Id. at 1558.
Notably, there were only 2 instances of limiting instructions across the 50 trials, so

Diamond et al.'s results may not apply to this type of challenging instruction. Diamond et al.,
supra note 151, at 1604-05.

171.
172.

Id. at 1597-1604.
The biggest criticism involves the lack of deliberation in most comprehension studies.

See Marder, supra note 146, at 467.
173. Hon. Arthur J. Hanes, Jr. et al., The Plain English Projectofthe Alabama PatternJury
Instruction Committee-Civil, 68 ALA. LAW. 369, 369 (2007). Tiersma, supra note 145, at 110710; Marder, supra note 146, at 475-81.
174. Tiersma, supra note 145, at 1101-14.
175. Diamond et al., supranote 151, at 1558.
176. Lieberman, supra note 92, at 141-43; Marder, supra note 146, at 498-505; Gordon
supra note 141, at 662-65.
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to the older, more linguistically challenging California Jury Instructions
Criminal (CALJIC) instructions.1 7 ' Non-deliberating mock jurors who
received the CALCRIM instructions demonstrated a significantly higher
understanding of aggravating and mitigating factors and were
substantially more accurate in explaining key concepts in their own
words.1 7 8 However, even with the revised instructions, they received an
average score of 53.4% on a comprehension measure. 17 9 Although this
study likely underestimates average comprehension of plain English
instructions due to the complexity of the concepts and the lack of
deliberation, it supports the growing consensus that linguistic revision
improves jurors' comprehension of instructions, but by itself cannot
eliminate the problem. 8 0
B. Methods for the PatternInstructionAnalysis
To assess the instructions for character evidence that currently are
provided to jurors, I located pattern instructions for criminal trials for
every state court, the District of Columbia courts, and the federal circuits.
Although other jury instructions may be given on an ad-hoc basis,
officially sanctioned pattern instructions offer valuable insight into the
instructions that judges are most likely to provide-or not providejurors because they offer protection from appeal.' 8' Pattern instructions
were found for forty-seven state courts, the District of Columbia, and nine
federal circuits. 1 8 2 For each set of instructions, I conducted computerized
searches for the terms, character evidence, character, and reputation.1 8 3
Instructions that contained those terms were inspected to determine if
they related to the general use of character evidence and/or its
impeachment, especially cross-examination of a character witness; if so,
they were included in the analysis. Instructions were not included in the
analysis if they addressed (1) the use of testimony about character for

177.

Smith & Haney, supra note 1597, at 342.

178.
179.

Id.
Id.

180. Lieberman, supra note 92, at 141-43; Marder, supra note 146, at 498-505; Gordon
supra note 141, at 662-65.
181. Marder, supra note 146, at 459-60.
182. There currently are not pattern instructions for Nevada, New Hampshire, Rhode Island,
and the Second and Fourth Circuits. New Hampshire is in the process of developing pattern
instructions for criminal trials. At the time of the writing (October 2016), character evidence was

not included in the draft provided by the Drafting Committee of the New Hampshire Bar
Association's

Task

Force

on

Criminal

Jury

Instructions

(https://www.nhbar.org/legal-

links/criminaljuryinstructions. asp).
183. Jury instructions for the states of Wisconsin, Missouri, and Wyoming are not included
in electronic databases. Relevant instructions from these states were identified with the assistance
of local law librarians and state bar representatives.
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truthfulness that was introduced for purposes of assessing the credibility
of the defendant or a witness (corresponding to FRE 608), (2) limiting
instructions about evidence related to character that was introduced for
non-character purposes, such as motive, knowledge, or absence of
mistake (corresponding to FRE 404(b)(2)), or (3) the use of similar acts
evidence in sexual assault and child molestation cases (corresponding to
FRE 413-415).
All instructions included in the analysis were independently coded for
content by two scholars with expertise in jurors' use of character
evidence, with high levels of agreement between the coders.1 84
Instructions for the general use of character evidence were coded as to
whether they included the following pieces of information:
(a)
(b)

(c)

(d)
(e)

Character evidence should be used to consider the likelihood that
a defendant would commit a particular act.
Character evidence should be considered when determining
whether there is reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt.
Within this category, we examined whether instructions used
"standing alone" language indicating that character evidence by
itself can support an inference of reasonable doubt; this issue is
discussed in more detail in Part IV.C.2.
Admonitions that good character is not an excuse for crime and/or
that, even if the defendant is a person of good character, jurors are
required to convict when they are convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt of his guilt.
Character evidence should be considered in conjunction with
other evidence.
Statements about the weight that should be given to character
evidence.

Instructions for the cross-examination of character evidence were
coded as to whether they informed jurors that:
(a)
(b)

Questions from cross-examination should be used to consider
whether the character witness is credible and knowledgeable
about the defendant.
Information from cross-examination questions should not be
treated as evidence or used to evaluate the guilt of the defendant.
Statements that jurors should not assume that negative actions of
the defendant included in "have you heard?" questions actually
occurred were included in this category.

184. Agreement between the two coders was quite high, indicating that the coding was
reliable (Cohen's Kappas = .92-.93).
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To gain insight into the likelihood that the average juror would be able
to comprehend judicial instructions for character evidence, three
measures of readability were computed by pasting each instruction into
Microsoft Word and an online readability calculator.' Because many of
the instructions provided different options to help judges tailor them to
specific cases (e.g., specifying a particular character trait or crime;
indicating whether reputation or opinion testimony was given), the
instructions were cleaned and standardized into a form that could be used
in a given case before computing readability statistics. Specifically, I
inserted honesty as the relevant character trait, fraud as the crime, and
male pronouns for the defendant, and then eliminated any additional
options and removed extra punctuation and numbering. This process
provided a more accurate assessment of readability by presenting the
instructions as they actually would be used at trial.
The three measures of language computed for this analysis were:
(a)

(b)

(c)

185.

Word count. In general, shorter passages are easy to
understand, 186 although in many cases there are tradeoffs between
the number of words, amount of information provided, and
quality of explanation (e.g., including examples is likely to
increase both comprehension and word count).1 7
Flesch Reading Ease. Generally recognized as the most
commonly used readability index, this formula estimates
readability based on the number of words per sentence and the
number of syllables per word.' The score indicates the difficulty
of written material on a scale from 0 (extremely difficult) to 100
(extremely easy). Scores of 60-70 are considered "standard,"
scores of 50-60 are considered "fairly difficult," and scores of 3050 are considered "difficult." 8 9
Average Grade Level. This score aggregates five common
readability indices: The Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level, GunningFog Score, Coleman-Liau Index, SMOG Index, and Automated
Readability Index. A recent report by the National Center for
Education Statistics shows that 52% of U.S. residents have basic
or below basic levels of literacy, and only 12% reach a level of
https://readability-score.com/

(this website was used as the online readability

calculator).
186.

Diamond et al., supra note 151, at 1556 (finding that the length ofjury instructions was

the strongest predictor of comprehension errors).
187. Peter M. Tiersma, Communicating with Juries: How to Write More Understandable
Instructions, 10 SCRIBES J. L. WRITING 1, 17, 22-23, 25 (2006).
188. J. Peter Kincaid et al., Derivation of new readabilityformulas (automatedreadability
index, fog count, andflesch reading easeformula)for Navy enlistedpersonnel, in 8-75 RESEARCH
BRANCH REPORT at 2 (1975). Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a006655.pdf.
189. See generally J. PETER KJNCAID, THE ART OF READABLE WRITING (1975).

270

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 28

'

"proficient" that is adequate for complex, college-level
material.1 90 The Department of Health and Human Services
considers texts at the 7th-8th grade level to be "average difficulty"
and texts at the 10th grade or higher level to be "difficult."' 9
It is important to note that there are several valid criticisms of
readability formulas; for example, in some cases, long words are familiar,
and short sentences are choppy and disconnected. They also fail to assess
the manner of presentation of the material,1 9 2 which, as discussed earlier,
is often a problem with jury instructions.1 9 3 However, readability indices
do provide valuable insights as general indicators of the difficulty of text,
helping to identify passages that are likely to be challenging for the
average person so that thoughtful revisions can be made.
C. Results of the PatternInstructionAnalysis
Summary statistics for the content, length, and readability of pattern
instructions for the general use of character evidence provided by state
courts (including the District of Columbia) and federal circuit courts are
provided in Table 1. Comparable information for cross-examination
instructions is given in Table 2. A complete breakdown by jurisdiction
for this information is available upon request from the author.
1. Prevalence of Jury Instructions for Character Evidence and Its
Cross-Examination
As seen in Table 1, pattern instructions for the general use of character
evidence were found for twenty-six of the forty-eight (54.2%) states
(including the District of Columbia) and seven of the nine federal circuits
that provide pattern instructions for criminal trials (77.8%). Thus, nearly
half of state courts do not provide jurors with any guidance about the use
of character evidence. In some cases, courts have held that character
evidence is covered by general instructions about the use of evidence. For

190. Madeline Goodman et al., Literacy, Numeracy, and Problem Solving in TechnologyRich Environments Among US. Adults: Results from the Program for the International
Assessment of Adult Competencies 2012: First Look (NCES 2014-008) at 5 (2013). Retrieved

from http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2014/2014008.pdf.
191. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, Toolkit for Making Written Materials Clear and Effective: Part 7 Using Readability
Formulas: A Cautionary Note (CMS Product No. 11476) at 23-24 (2010). Retrieved from
https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-andEducation/Outreach/WrittenMaterialsToolkit/DownloadsToolkitPart07.pdf
192. Id. at 4.
193. Dumas, supra note 145, at 737-38; Marder, supra note 146, at 491.
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example, in State v. Cox,1 9 4 the Kansas Supreme Court held that character
evidence is covered under the instruction for "Credibility of Witnesses,"
which states, "It is for you to determine the weight and credit to be given
the testimony of each witness. You have a right to use common
knowledge and experience in regard to the matter about which a witness
has testified." 195 Other jurisdictions, such as Alaska, Indiana, and the 9 th
Circuit, once provided instructions for character evidence, but
subsequently withdrew them.1 9 6
As seen in Table 2, even fewer jurisdictions provide jury instructions
about the intended use of character evidence cross-examination. Only
eight states and the District of Columbia (9/48 or 18.8%) and two federal
circuits (2/9 or 22.2%) with pattern instructions for criminal trials address
this issue.
The lack of pattern jury instructions for character evidence is a cause
for concern. Character evidence is a distinctive form of evidence because
it is intended to provide insight into the type of person a defendant is
rather than provide proof of whether he or she committed the crime with
which he or she is charged. As a result, jurors may be confused about how
to use character evidence or rely on misconceptions about the relationship
between personality and behavior1 9 7 if they are not properly instructed.
The fact that over three-quarters of U.S. states and federal circuits that
have officially sanctioned pattern instructions do not provide jurors with
instructions about character evidence cross-examination is an issue of
even greater concern. Psychological research shows that mock jurors
frequently misuse negative acts information from cross-examination
when determining the guilt of the defendant.1 9 8 In the absence of jury
instructions, there is no way for jurors to know how they are-and are
not-supposed to use this information. Given its potential to increase the
likelihood of conviction, jury instructions for character evidence crossexamination are arguably more important than instructions for the general
use of character evidence, but they are significantly less common. Thus,
an important conclusion from this analysis is that there is a need for more
jurisdictions to develop pattern instructions for character evidence and,
in particular, its cross-examination.

194.

State v. Cox, 304 P.3d 327, 337 (Kan. 2013).

195.
196.

Pattern Instructions for Kansas-Criminal 4th ed. 51.060.
Alaska Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction § 1.41; Indiana Pattern Jury Instructions

Criminal Instruction No. 12.15
197.

See supra text accompanying notes 79-93.

198.

See supra text accompanying notes 99-124.
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2. Content of Jury Instructions for Character Evidence
When jury instructions for character evidence are given, their content
varies considerably (see Table 1). Information about the purpose of
character evidence-that is, to help jurors consider whether the defendant
is the sort of person who would be likely to commit a particular crimeis included in 14/26 (53.8%) of state instructions and 4/7 (57.1%) of
federal instructions. For example, the Iowa instruction states in part:
Evidence has been received concerning the defendant's [character]
for [honesty]. This evidence should be considered with all other
evidence in determining whether the defendant is guilty or not. If
you find the defendant's [character] as to [honesty] is good, you
may consider this evidence in determining whether a person of
such [character] for [honesty] would be likely to commit the crime
charged. 1
Jurors are instructed that character evidence can be used to help
determine whether there is reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt
in 17/26 (65.4%) of the state pattern instructions and 6/7 (85.7%) of the
federal pattern instructions. However, the nature of these instructions
varies in meaningful ways across jurisdictions. In an early case
concerning character evidence, Edgington v. United States,2 00 the
Supreme Court held that character evidence itself ("standing alone") was
enough to raise a reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt, but it did
not require jurors to be instructed on the issue. Although the Supreme
Court provided dictum in Michelson20 1 that such an instruction should be
given, courts still disagree about its appropriateness almost seventy years
later. In the current analysis, eight states (California, Iowa, Michigan,
New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina),
the District of Columbia, and the 5th and 11th Circuits 2 02 provide jurors
with "standing alone" instructions. For example, Michigan courts instruct
jurors that:
You have heard evidence about the defendant's character for
[honesty]. You may consider this evidence, together with all the
other evidence in the case, in deciding whether the defendant
committed the crime with which [he] is charged. Evidence of good
199. Iowa Criminal Jury Instructions, § 200.38 (2016) (alteration to the original in the
quoted text).
200. Edgington v. United States, 164 U.S. 361, 364 (1896).
201. Michelson v. United States 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948).
202. United States v. John, 309 F.3d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Thomas, 676
F.2d 531, 536 (11th Cir. 1982).
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character alone may sometimes create a reasonable doubt in your
minds and lead you to find the defendant not guilty. 2 03
The 3rd, 7th, and 10th Circuits state that "standing alone" instructions
are not required, but can be given at the discretion of the trial court.20 4 In
contrast, 3 states (Illinois, Maryland, Wisconsin) as well as the 1st, 6th,
and 8th CircuitS 205 recommend against the use of "standing alone"
instructions, largely due to concerns that they would draw too much
attention to character evidence relative to the other trial evidence. For
example, the instruction for the 6th Circuit states: "You have heard
testimony about the defendant's good character. You should consider this
testimony, along with all the other evidence, in deciding if the
government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the
crime charged." 2 0 6
In a related vein, some instructions contain admonishments about the
limits of good character. These instructions either state that good
character is not an excuse for crime or state that, regardless of good
character, a defendant must be found guilty if the evidence eliminates
reasonable doubt.2 0 7 These "convict despite character" instructions are
found in fifteen of the twenty-six (57.7%) state instructions, but none of
the federal instructions. For example, the instruction in Oklahoma states:
The defendant has introduced evidence of [his] character for
[honesty]. This evidence may be sufficient when considered with
the other evidence in the case to raise a reasonable doubt of the
defendant's guilt. However, if from all the evidence in the case you
are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt,
then you may find [him] guilty, even though [he] may have a good
character. 208

The most common instruction given to jurors about the use of
character evidence is that it is to be used in conjunction with other trial
evidence. This information is included in every pattern instruction (state
and federal) located for this analysis. For example, Nebraska jurors are
203. Michigan Model Criminal Jury Instructions, No. 5.8a (1992).
204. United States v. Spangler, 838 F.2d 85, 87 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Ross, 77
F.3d 1525, 1538 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. McMurray, 656 F.2d 540, 551 (10th Cir. 1980).
The 2nd Circuit also has held that "standing alone" instructions are not required. United States v.

Pujana-Mena, 949 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1991).
205. United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1148 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 487 U.S.
1224 (1988); Poliafico v. United States, 237 F.2d 97, 114 (6th Cir. 1956); United States v. Krapp,
815 F.2d 1183, 1187 (8th Cir. 1987); People v. H-rdlicka, 176 N.E. 308, 312 (1ll. 1931).
206.
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207.
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(2016).
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told: "Evidence of the defendant's character for [honesty] has been
received to help you to decide whether [he] committed the crime charged.
You may consider this evidence along with all the other evidence in
making your decision."209
Finally, 10/26 (38.5%) of state courts and 3/7 (42.9%) of federal
courts address the weight that jurors should give to character evidence.
However, most of these instructions are quite general and simply indicate
that jurors should consider character evidence in the same (undefined)
way that they consider other evidence or "as they see fit." For example,
North Carolina jurors are instructed, in part, that: "Ifyou believe from the
evidence that the defendant possesses the character trait of [honesty], you
may consider this in your determination of the defendant's guilt or
innocence and give such weight as you decide it should receive in light
of all the other evidence." 210
Overall, there is substantial variability in the overall informativeness
of jury instructions on the use of character evidence. Only two of the
instructions (District of Columbia, Massachusetts) contain all five pieces
of information coded and eight of the instructions (Georgia, Iowa,
Louisiana, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 1st Circuit) include
four of the five pieces of information. For example, the instruction from
Massachusetts is particularly informative:
You have heard a witness testify about the defendant's reputation
for [honesty] in the community in which [he] lives. Let me explain
to you how you may use such evidence. It does not matter whether
any particular witness believes the defendant is guilty or not guilty.
That question is for you alone to determine. However, knowing
what a person's reputation is in [his community] may be of some
help to you in making that decision. In some cases, a person's good
reputation may cause you to doubt whether a person of that
character would commit such an offense. If you determine that the
witness has accurately reported the defendant's reputation in [his
community] for [honesty], you may consider that reputation, along
with all the other evidence in the case. It is for you to determine
the importance of such evidence. If the defendant's reputation,
together with all the other evidence, leaves you with a reasonable
doubt, then you must find [him] not guilty. On the other hand, if
all the evidence convinces you of the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, then it is your duty to find [him] guilty, even
though [he] may have a good reputation. 2 1 1

209.
210.
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In contrast, nine instructions only contain two pieces of the coded
information about the use of character evidence. For example, the
instruction from Arizona simply states: "You have heard evidence of the
defendant's character for [honesty]. In deciding this case, you should
consider that evidence together with, and in the same manner as, all the
other evidence in the case." 212 Instructions like this provide jurors with
very little useful guidance and probably are not much better than
receiving no instruction at all. Even worse, the ambiguity could confuse
jurors and potentially have a negative impact on their decision making
process.
3. Content of Jury Instructions for Cross-Examination of
Character Evidence
In contrast to instructions for the use of character evidence, there is
much more consistency in the content of pattern instructions for the crossexamination of character evidence. As seen in Table 2, every state and
federal circuit that provides instructions for this issue specifies that the
purpose of cross-examination is to evaluate the credibility of the character
witness and/or her knowledge of the defendant. For example, the
instruction from Massachusetts states in part:
On cross-examination, the Commonwealth was allowed to ask this
witness whether [he] had heard rumors or reports about certain
events in which the defendant was allegedly involved. Those
questions and answers were allowed for one purpose only-to help
you decide how well this witness knows the defendant's reputation
in [his community] and whether the witness has described it to you
accurately. You may consider those questions and answers only to
evaluate how familiar this witness is with the defendant's
reputation, and how accurately the witness has recounted it to
you.

2 13

Seven of the nine (77.8%) of the states (including the District of
Columbia) and both of the federal circuits also provide limiting
instructions about bad acts information that may be given in crossexamination questions. Jurors are cautioned that they are not supposed to
use bad acts information as evidence to judge the defendant or make
inferences about guilt. For example, the instruction for the Third Circuit
states in part:

This [cross-examination] is not evidence that the acts described in
212.

ARIZ. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS -CRIMINAL

213.

MASS. SUPERIOR COURT CRIMINAL PRACTICE JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Standard Criminal 8 (2014).

§

7.5.3 (2013).

276

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OFLAW & PUBLICPOLICY

[Vol. 28

these questions actually occurred. You may not use the
information developed by the prosecutor on this subject for any
other purpose. Specifically, you may not use this information to
conclude that the defendant committed the act charged in the
indictment or as proof that the defendant has a bad character or any
propensity to commit crimes. 2 14
Thus, nearly all pattern instructions for the cross-examination of
character evidence provide jurors with the information they need to use
the information correctly-or at least to attempt to, given the
psychological difficulty of following limiting instructions. 2 15 This is an
encouraging finding; however, it must be counterbalanced by the earlier
finding that only about 20% of state and federal jurisdictions provide such
instructions. Given this, it seems that the most problematic aspect ofjury
instructions for character evidence cross-examination is their omission,
not their content.
4. Language of Jury Instructions for Character Evidence and Its
Cross-Examination
Moving from an examination of content to an analysis of language, it
is evident that current jury instructions for character evidence and its
cross-examination have characteristics that are likely to make them
difficult to understand.
Beginning with length, as seen in Table 1, the average length of state
instructions for the use of character evidence is 99.31 words (range = 34201), and the average length of the corresponding federal instructions is
69.14 words (range = 27-132). For cross-examination instructions (see
Table 2), the average length is 96.33 words (range = 42-156) for state
instructions and 109.50 (range = 95-124) for federal instructions. Perhaps
the most striking aspect of these data is the variability in length, with
some instructions being quite short and others quite long. Although some
of the longer instructions could be shortened without a loss of content or
clarity, as a whole, these instructions illustrate the tradeoff between
length and content. At the end of Part IV.C.2, I presented examples of
especially informative and non-informative instructions for character
evidence. The highly educational instruction from Massachusetts has 198
words, whereas the barebones instruction from Arizona is 34 words.
Thus, shorter is not necessarily better, and the general goal of avoiding
overly lengthy jury instructions must be balanced with the need to
provide jurors with sufficient information.

214.
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Clearer evidence of linguistic difficulty comes from the readability
measures. The average Flesch Reading Ease score for the character
evidence instructions was 44.54 (range = 5.0-57.6) for the state
instructions and 38.9 (range = 26.3-45.5) for the federal instructions. For
the cross-examination instructions, the means were 45.23 (range = 29.852.1) for the state instructions and 42.8 (range = 41.2-44.4) for the federal
instructions. These values indicate that almost all of the instructions are
"difficult" for the average person to read, let alone process orally. 2 16
Likewise, the average grade level for the character evidence instructions
was 14.58 (range = 11.6-25.1) for the state instructions and 15.23 (range
= 12.7-19.5) for federal instructions. For the cross-examination
instructions, they were 14.59 (range = 11.2-17.5) for the state instructions
and 13.9 (range = 13.7-14.1) for federal instructions. These grade levels
are well into college and, in some cases, graduate school reading levelssubstantially higher than the 7th-8th grade level recommended for the
general public. 2 17 As an illustration, the most challenging instruction was
an instruction for the use of character evidence from the State of New
Jersey:
Evidence of good character or reputation of an accused is always
competent in the trial of a criminal action, and is entitled to be
considered by you. You, the jury, should consider all of the
relevant testimony, including that relating to the defendant's good
character or reputation, and if, on such consideration, there exists
a reasonable doubt of [his] guilt, even though that doubt may arise
merely from [his] previous good repute, [he] is entitled to an
acquittal; but if, from the entire evidence in this case, including
that relating to good character, you believe the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, [he] should be convicted and the
evidence of good character should not alter the verdict.2 18
This instruction contains difficult vocabulary (e.g., repute) and words
used in an uncommon manner (e.g., competent is used to refer to
relevance rather than ability). It also contains lengthy sentences with
numerous clauses and difficult syntax. Even educated jurors are likely to
struggle to understand and correctly apply such an instruction. Although
the New Jersey instruction is an extreme example, most of the current
jury instructions for character evidence and its cross-examination share
similar features that are likely to negatively impact jurors' understanding
of how they are supposed to use this information when making trial
judgments.
216.
217.
218.
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5. Conclusions about Pattern Jury Instructions for Character Evidence
and Its Cross-Examination
Overall, this analysis of state and federal pattern instructions for
character evidence reveals important issues that are likely to limit the
utility of jury instructions for reducing the misuse of character evidence.
First, in many cases, jurors may not receive instructions related to
character evidence. Only about half of the states and three-quarters of the
federal circuits that have pattern instructions for criminal trials provide
instructions for the use of character evidence. Of even greater concern,
only about 20% of state and federal courts have pattern instructions for
character evidence cross-examination. Thus, jurors are least likely to
receive instructions about the component of character evidence that is the
most counterintuitive, difficult to use correctly, and likely to lead to
outcomes that threaten defendants' right to a fair trial. Second, many
pattern instructions for character evidence fail to provide jurors with
adequate information and guidance. The analysis reveals considerable
variability in instructions for the general use of character evidence, with
some jurisdictions providing substantial information and other
jurisdictions providing barebones statements that offer little guidance.
For example, only about half of the instructions give jurors basic
information about the purpose of character evidence. 2 19 Thus, jurors may
be left with important questions about the use of character evidence, even
after receiving instructions. Instructions for the cross-examination of
character evidence are more uniformly informative, but, as noted earlier,
are much less likely to exist. Third, pattern instructions are written in a
manner that jurors are likely to find challenging. Although there is
substantial variability in length, that generally reflects differences in the
amount of information contained in each instruction. A more important
concern involves the difficulty of the text itself. Nearly all of the
instructions are written in "difficult" language that reflects college or
higher reading levels. As a result, even when jurors are given meaningful
instructions about character evidence, they may not fully understand
them. This issue is considered in the following part.
D. Lay ComprehensionofJury Instructionsfor CharacterEvidence
To assess whether current pattern instructions for character evidence
are likely to be helpful to jurors, my colleagues and I conducted two

219.

Id.
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studies examining lay people's ability to comprehend them.2 2 0 In both
studies, we recruited national samples ofjury-eligible adults to participate
in online research.2 2 ' Participants read pattern instructions for character
evidence and cross-examination, answered basic multiple choice
questions about them, and then attempted to describe the instructions in
their own words as if explaining them to a friend. Participants also were
asked to indicate what, if anything, was confusing about the instructions.
In the first study, 302 participants read one of six pattern instructions
for the use of character evidence, coming from the 7th Circuit, 11th
Circuit, Delaware, Massachusetts, California, or Tennessee. They also
read one of five instructions for cross-examination, coming from the 3rd
Circuit, 8th Circuit, California, Massachusetts, or a model instruction
from Federal Jury Practice and Instructions.2 2 2 We chose these
instructions to reflect a range of lengths, linguistic difficulty, and depth
of content. The majority of participants were able to correctly answer
basic multiple choice questions about these instructions. For example,
88.4% of participants (range = 83.3-94.8%) indicated that the purpose of
character evidence is "to consider whether the defendant is the sort of
person would be likely to commit the crime." Likewise, 84.3% (range =
75.0-92.6%) correctly answered a question about the proper use of crossexamination, although a non-negligible minority (15.7%) asserted that
cross-examination should be used to evaluate the defendant. Not
surprisingly, there was some variability in participants' understanding
across jurisdictions; for example, participants who read the Tennessee
instruction (29%) were more likely than participants who read
instructions from other jurisdictions (2.6-14.0%) to assert that a
defendant should be convicted if he seemed like a person with bad
character.
Despite fairly good performance on basic recognition questions,
participants' open-ended descriptions revealed important limitations to
their understanding. For the character evidence instruction, only 27.0%
of participants correctly explained its purpose, 25.3% discussed its use in
220. Jennifer S. Hunt et al., Lay Comprehension of Jury Instructions for Character
Evidence: Comparisons across Pattern Instructions, Presentation Formats, and Difficulty of
Language, manuscript under review.
221. Participants were recruited through Mechanical Turk (MTurk), which is a website
administered by Amazon.com. On the site, "requesters," such as researchers, can advertise tasks
to "workers," who can choose to do them for compensation. Social scientists have used MTurk
extensively in recent years because it facilitates the recruitment of samples that are both
geographically and demographically diverse. Michael Buhrmester et al., Amazon's Mechanical
Turk: A New Source of Inexpensive, Yet High-Quality, Data? 6 PERSPECTIVES PSYCHOL. Sci. 3

(2011).
222. Kevin F. O'Malley et al., IA Fed Jury Prac. & Instr. § 11.15 (6th ed.). We also
included instructions for reasonable doubt and inadmissible evidence as fillers to separate the two

character evidence instructions.
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determining reasonable doubt, and 35.0% indicated that it should be
considered along with other evidence. 37.3% of participants failed to
include any of these elements in their description. Participants'
descriptions of cross-examination instructions were somewhat better,
with 63.1% explaining that it should be used to evaluate the character
witness's credibility, and 49.3% indicating that it should be not
considered evidence or used to judge the defendant. Still, a sizable
number (22.1%) failed to mention either element, and 14.5% asserted that
cross-examination should be used to evaluate the defendant. Notably, in
both cases, the majority of participants asserted that they did not have any
confusion about the instructions, suggesting a lack of insight into their
limited comprehension. 2 23
It is important to point out that the levels of comprehension in the first
study are likely to be a best-case scenario because participants read the
instructions for character evidence and cross-examination in isolation and
answered questions about each one before moving on to the next. Thus,
we conducted a follow-up study to determine whether comprehension
changed when the two instructions were presented together. In addition,
we tested alternative forms of the instructions involving simplified
language and model instructions.2 2 4
Three hundred and sixty (360) participants read an instruction for
character evidence (the existing Tennessee instruction, a simplified
version of it, or a model instruction) and an instruction for crossexamination (Massachusetts, simplified, or model). These instructions
were presented either separately or jointly. Overall, results replicated the
pattern from the first study in which participants performed relatively
well on basic recognition questions, but gave vague open-ended
descriptions that omitted key elements of the instructions. Importantly,
comprehension of the instructions was lower when they were presented
jointly rather than separately. For example, correct answers for the
multiple choice question about the proper use of cross-examination fell
from 85.7% to 60.3%, with the biggest drop (from 89.4% to 47.2%) for
the original Massachusetts instruction. Likewise, participants' openended descriptions included significantly fewer elements when the
instructions were presented jointly. There was a particularly large decline
for explanations of the use of cross-examination, suggesting that when
instructions for character evidence and cross-examination are presented
together, participants fail to grasp the important distinctions between their
223. See also Diamond et al., supra note 151, at 1543. Other participants indicated
confusions about the mechanics of using character evidence, the assumptions underlying character
evidence, and the linguistic difficulty of the instructions.
224. We also tested alternative formats, including a flowchart and informational table.
Neither of these formats improved comprehension, so they will not be discussed here. For more
information, see Hunt et al., supra note 220.
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purposes and intended use. Finally, the simplified language and model
instructions were associated with greater comprehension, but the results
were fairly modest (e.g., improvements of 4-17% on the recognition
questions).
Together, these studies provide additional support for the argument
that current pattern jury instructions are unlikely to provide adequate
guidance for jurors and prevent the misuse of character evidence and its
cross-examination. Although most jury-eligible adults are able to answer
rudimentary questions about these instructions, many cannot generate
essential elements of the intended purpose and proper use of character
evidence, even shortly after reading them. Further, when character
evidence and cross-examination instructions are presented jointly-as
they are likely to be in many trials-jurors may form a holistic
understanding that blurs the critical differences in the intended targets
and use of the information. These two studies, in conjunction with the
analysis of current pattern instructions, thus indicate that substantial work
is needed to improve the clarity, informativeness, impact, and availability
of jury instructions for character evidence and its rebuttal.

V.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The good character exception for character evidence has intuitive
appeal. It is easy to see how a defendant might think that having one or
more people who know her well testify that she is simply not the sort of
person who would commit a particular crime might lead jurors to doubt
her guilt. Legal scholars have argued that character testimony is a way to
encourage jurors to see defendants as fellow humans, 225 to help them to
understand who they are as people, 226 and to help ensure that they
approach the evidence with the presumption of innocence. 22 7 Character
evidence is seen as an advantage to defendants, providing an additional
means of mounting a defense in absence of the resources held by the
state. 2 28 Although the prosecution is allowed to rebut character evidence,
that trade-off is generally regarded as well-balanced by the defendant's
ability to decide whether to introduce it.2 29 Even scholars who propose
major revisions to the rules for character evidence tend to focus on the
evidence that is allowed for the prosecution, preserving the current

225. Milich, supra note 25, at 793; Ross, supra note 8, at 256-58.
226. Leonard, supra note 41, at 3, 38-42; Ross, supra note 8, at 278.
227. Milich, supra note 25, at 791-97; Ross, supra note 8, at 227-28, 256-58, 276-77.
228. Uviller, supra note 5, at 855; Ross, supra note 8, at 235-36, 253-54.
229. Crump, supra note 18, at 687-90; Melilli, supra note 43, at 1625-26; contra Ross,
supra note 8, at 234-36.
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system by which defendants can introduce evidence of good character. 2 3 0
The current article challenges this view by arguing that the good
character exception is structured in a way that has relatively little chance
of helping defendants and a much stronger potential for harming them.
By integrating legal scholarship with relevant psychological research,
several important problems with the current system of character evidence
are revealed. Empirical research shows that positive character evidence
in the form of general opinion or reputation testimony is unlikely to have
a strong influence on jurors. 2 3 1 In contrast, the specific negative acts
information that can be used to cross-examine character evidence is far
more powerful, and jurors are likely to misuse it to judge the defendant's
guilt in addition to evaluating the character witness's credibility.2 3 2
Further, prosecutors are able to use character evidence cross-examination
to discuss information that otherwise would not be admissible, such as
arrests that did not lead to convictions or even bad acts that are known
only on "good faith." 2 3 3 As a result, the balance favors the prosecution,
and defendants who choose to introduce character evidence risk a
backlash effect in which they are more likely to be convicted if they
introduce positive character evidence that is rebutted than if they do not
introduce character evidence at all.
This Article also challenges a common recommendation for
addressing concerns about the use of character evidence, which is to
provide jurors with limiting instructions that explain its proper use. The
comprehensive analysis of state and federal pattern instructions for
character evidence presented in this article reveals that current jury
instructions are unlikely to ameliorate jurors' misuse of character
evidence. First, many states and federal circuits do not offer pattern
instructions for character evidence. In particular, only about 20% of
jurisdictions have pattern instructions for cross-examination, which is the
aspect of character evidence that is most likely to be misunderstood and
misused. Second, current pattern instructions often fail to provide jurors
with key pieces of information about character evidence, such as its
purpose. Although some jurisdictions have highly informative
instructions for character evidence, others have minimal instructions that
provide jurors with almost no useful guidance. Third, these instructions
tend to be written using complex language and syntax, so jurors are likely
to have difficulty comprehending and applying them. In fact, two recent
studies demonstrate that lay people tend to have a limited understanding
of character evidence instructions, with many being unable to describe
230.

Leach, supra note 58, at 866; Melilli touts leaving the good character exception as a

strength of his proposal. Melilli, supra note 43, at 1625.
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key elements of the purpose and use of the evidence, even shortly after
reading them. Further, comprehension goes down when instructions for
character evidence and its rebuttal are presented jointly, suggesting that
jurors may find it challenging to separate the different ways in which
these pieces of information are supposed to be used. Together, these
findings support the argument that current pattern instructions for
character evidence are unlikely to provide defendants with adequate
protection from the structural imbalances of the good character exception.
If, at best, the good character exception may fail to provide any
meaningful benefit and, at worst, it opens a door that can make defendants
more likely to be convicted, what should be done? I propose a number of
possible recommendations, from trial strategy to developing better jury
instructions to changes in the rules for the admissibility and format of
character evidence.
A. Trial Strategy
The easiest, but least satisfying, recommendation is that defense
attorneys should not introduce evidence of good character in criminal
trials. 2 3 4 The potential for gain is likely to be slight and far outweighed
by the potential risks of exposing jurors to negative information about the
defendants' prior bad acts. Defense attorneys need to be better educated
about the risks of introducing character evidence, so that they can be
appropriately cautious about using it as part of their trial strategy.
However, there are notable downsides to this recommendation.
Choosing not to introduce character evidence does not "fix" any of the
problems identified in this Article; it just avoids their influence in specific
cases. Further, it does not do anything to advance the basic, worthy goals
of the good character exception. If important rationales for character
evidence involve giving defendants an additional means of defense 235 and
a chance to "tell their story," 236 treating it as a non-option could reduce
the perceived legitimacy and justice of criminal trials. This strategy
eliminates the chance that any of the potential benefits of character
evidence for both defendants 2 37 and jurorS 2 38 Will occur. In particular,
character evidence may provide a valuable tool for reducing the persistent
problem of racial bias in jury decision-making. 2 3 9 Psychological research

234. See, e.g., Crump, supra note 18, at 672, 675, 683.
235. FED. R. EviD. 404 advisory committee's notes (2011); Uviller, supra note 5, at 855.
236. Leonard, supra note 41, at 38-42.
237. Potential benefits to the defendant include humanization, identification, and
maximizing the presumption of innocence. See supra text accompanying notes 35-39.
238. Character evidence may fulfill jurors' desire to get a sense of who the defendant is. See
supra text accompanying notes 40-42.
239. Ross, supra note 8, at 261-68; Hunt, supra note 133, at 275-77.

284

UNIVIRSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 28

suggests that jurors may be more influenced by character evidence when
it challenges racial stereotypes, and positive character evidence may
reduce racial bias in guilt judgments for Black defendants. 240 if, in
addition to its other benefits, character evidence has the potential to
reduce discriminatory outcomes, it should not be simply be pushed to the
side without attempting to address the problems with its current structure.
More generally, the FRE Advisory Committee observed that a criminal
defendant's ability to introduce evidence of good character has
"assume[d] almost constitutional proportions" 24 1 in U.S. jurisprudence.
In this context, a recommendation that attorneys simply should avoid it
is clearly insufficient.
B. Jury Instructions
Another relatively modest recommendation involves improving jury
instructions. All jurisdictions should provide jurors with clear,
understandable instructions for character evidence that address its
purpose and intended use. Of particular importance, all jurisdictions
should clearly instruct jurors about permissible and impermissible uses
of cross-examination, since jurors are both likely to perceive this
information as relevant to trial judgments and unlikely to intuitively infer
the intended limits of its use. Given that only about 20% of jurisdictions
with officially sanctioned pattern instructions currently provide jurors
with guidance on this issue, there is considerable opportunity for positive
change.
Although seemingly straightforward, it is important to note that, once
again, there are several challenges involved with this recommendation.
As discussed earlier, some courts and pattern jury instruction committees
have held that there is no need for separate instructions on character
evidence; 2 4 2 for example, the Kansas Supreme Court 2 4 3 recently held that
the general instruction for the credibility of witnesses provides adequate
guidance for character evidence. These decisions are easily criticized for
failing to appreciate the clear differences between character evidence and
other forms of witness testimony as well as the non-intuitive use of
character evidence cross-examination; however, they pose formidable
barriers. Another challenge involves developing instructions that achieve
240.
241.

Maeder & Hunt, supra note 8, at 613-14.
FED. R. EVID.404 advisory committee's notes (2011).

242.

Manual of Model Jury Instructions for the Ninth Circuit, No. 4.4 (withdrawn) (2010);

Indiana Pattern Jury Instructions - Criminal, No. 12-15 (withdrawn) (2015). The Idaho Pattern
Jury Instruction Committee determined that an instruction for character evidence "would
constitute a comment on the evidence" and therefore did not recommend giving one. Idaho

Criminal Jury Instructions, No. 304 (2010).
243. State v. Cox, 304 P.3d 327, 337 (Kan. 2013).
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the difficult balance of being clear and accessible, yet informative. Past
efforts to revise jury instructions through simplified language and syntax
have had limited success in improving jurors' comprehension and
judgments. 2 4 Thus, even consistently providing well-written jury
instructions may not eliminate the misuse of character evidence and its
**
245
cross-examination.
While acknowledging these challenges, the development, revision,
and increased use of jury instructions is likely to be seen as the most
viable strategy for addressing concerns about the good character
exception. To that end, I propose the following instructions, based on the
research about lay people's comprehension of character evidence
instructions 24 6 described in Part IV.E., as a good starting point for pattern
jury instruction committees:
You heard a witness describe the defendant's good character and
reputation. This testimony can give you a sense of what the
defendant is like as a person. You may think about whether a
person with those traits is likely to commit a specific crime. You
should consider character evidence along with all other evidence.
If the character testimony raises a reasonable doubt in your mind,
you should find the defendant not guilty. But, if all of the evidence
convinces you of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
you must find him guilty, even if he has a good reputation.
During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked the character
witness questions about some of the defendant's past behaviors.
These questions are not evidence. You must use them differently
from the character witness's testimony about the defendant. The
only purpose of these questions is to help you decide how credible
the character witness is and how well she knows the defendant. Do
not use this information to judge the defendant's character or his
guilt. The fact that the prosecutor asked about certain behaviors is
not proof that they actually happened.
In addition to improving the quality and clarity of the instructions, it
is critical for courts to present them in ways that maximize
comprehension and impact. Jurors should be provided with written copies
244. See supra text accompanying notes 173-178.
245. In fact, Maeder & Hunt found that mock jurors misused negative acts information from
character evidence cross-examination even when given jury instructions. However, it is important
to note that, to maximize ecological validity, we used existing jury instructions from the State of
Nebraska, which were fairly minimal, rather than creating new instructions that might have
increased comprehension. Maeder & Hunt, supra note 8, at 613-14.
246. Hunt et al., supra note 220.
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of the instructions that they can refer back to during deliberation, 247 and
they should be allowed to ask the judge questions about the proper use of
character evidence and cross-examination to confirm their
understanding. 248 An additional recommendation is to give jurors
instructions for character evidence cross-examination immediately
before (or if necessary, immediately after) it occurs in a trial. 249 Lay
people are better able to understand the proper use of cross-examination
when they are instructed about it separately, 250 and receiving those
instructions at the same time as they hear cross-examination questions
may minimize impermissible inferences about the defendant's negative
acts that jurors would need to attempt to correct later. 25 1
C. StructuralRecommendations
The final set of recommendations involves changes to the rules and
structure for good character evidence provided in FRE 404(a)(2)(A) and
405(a) to directly tackle the current imbalance. Clearly, in making such
suggestions, one must be mindful of Justice Jackson's admonition in
Michelson that it may be difficult to alter individual components of the
rules of character evidence without upending the rest of it.2 5 2 Still, there
are some possibilities that are worth considering.
The minimalist approach to improving the good character exception
involves changing FRE 405(a) to allow character witnesses to support
opinion or reputation testimony with descriptions of the defendant's
positive actions. 253 This change would not make the defense's character
evidence as powerful as the prosecution's rebuttal, but it at least would
reduce the imbalance and maximize the potential benefits of introducing
character evidence. 254 Further, judges have indicated a willingness to
allow this sort of testimony, at least for character for honesty.25 5 A time
limit for character testimony could be established to ensure it does not
consume too much trial time. 256 This minimalist approach may be most
247.

Lieberman, supra note 92, at 143; Marder, supra note 146, at 499.

248.
249.

Lieberman, supra note 92, at 145-46; Marder, supra note 146, at 501-02.
Marder, supra note 146, at 498-99; Dumas, supra note 145, at 737.

250.

Hunt et al., supra note 220.
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effective in combination with improved jury instructions about the proper
use of cross-examination.
Other, larger changes would do much more to equalize the balance
between the defense and prosecution. From a psychological perspective,
a key reform would involve scaling back or eliminating prosecutors'
ability under FRE 405(a)25 7 to discuss the defendants' previous bad acts
during cross-examination. 2 5 8 For example, cross-examination of
character witnesses could be limited to questions that directly assess
credibility, such as questions about the opportunities the witnesses have
had to gain knowledge about the defendant. Prosecutors also could be
limited to questions that challenge character witnesses' opinions without
describing the defendant's negative acts (e.g., "You say that the
defendant is gentle. Are you saying that you have never seen him be
rough or aggressive?"). Alternatively, rebuttal could be limited to the
presentation of contrary character witnesses who also would be required
to use opinion or reputation testimony. Such changes in the nature of
rebuttal are likely to be controversial because they would create a system
in which the rebuttal of character witnesses would differ in meaningful
ways from the rebuttal of other witnesses. However, they have the
potential to reduce or even eliminate the imbalance between the defense's
and prosecution's evidence and to close the door that currently allows
prosecutors to use character evidence cross-examination to discuss acts
that otherwise would be inadmissible.
A more radical possibility would be to provide defendants with a
structured opportunity to provide information about themselves to the
jury in a format other than traditional testimony. For example, the defense
could be allowed to present a "character statement" analogous to an
allocution to describe the defendant to the jury. The maximum length of
this statement could vary based on the severity of the charges, and the
defense would be required to send it to the prosecution in advance of the
trial to prevent surprises and allow for challenges of potentially
inaccurate or misleading information. Following a pretrial approval
process, the statement would be presented at trial without direct rebuttal
because only information acceptable to both sides would be included. In
cases where the defendant has a history of negative acts, this process
257.
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the potential for prejudice.
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might mean that a character statement is quite short or even non-existent,
but it would ensure that challenges to the defense's desired character
evidence would be resolved outside of the presence of the jury.
The use of character statements may have the potential to achieve
many of the benefits of the current good character exception without
creating the same risks. It would give defendants the opportunity to
humanize themselves to the jury2 5 9 and fulfill the "cathartic function" of
telling their story. 2 60 Likewise, jurors would get a sense of who the
defendant is as a person. 2 6 1 This system would eliminate the "back door"
for inadmissible evidence as well as remove the current imbalance in
which prosecutors can rebut the candlelight benefit of positive character
evidence with the fire-hose of negative acts cross-examination. At the
same time, the requirement for pretrial approval would prevent inaccurate
information from being given to the jury. Finally, because the statement
would be presented as a personal narrative given by the defense, there is
relatively little concern that juries would overvalue it. 2 6 2 The potential
biases of the statement would be clear from its source, and jurors could
consider the information "for what it's worth" along with the rest of the
trial evidence. In fact, a potential downside to the use of character
statements is that jurors might give them too little weight because they
remove the benefit of having a well-regarded, high status, or likeable
character witness testify on behalf of the defendant.2 6 3 Overall, character
statements provide a potentially promising alternative format for
allowing criminal defendants to share information about character with
the jury without relying on the traditional, imbalanced structure of
character testimony.
In conclusion, this article has shown that the good character exception
in criminal trials currently creates an illusion in which an ostensible
benefit to defendants is outweighed by the potential for enormous risk,
and jurors are given insufficient instruction about how to properly use
this evidence. As a result, jurors often misuse character evidence in a
manner that actually can increase the likelihood that a defendant will be
convicted. The recommendations in this section are intended as a starting
point to encourage creative thinking about practically and politically
viable strategies for addressing the imbalances of the current system.
There certainly are other possible solutions, and in all likelihood, a
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262.
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combination of strategies (e.g., structural changes and better jury
instructions) will be needed to ensure that the ability to present evidence
of good character is more than an empty promise given to criminal
defendants.

TABLE 1. ANALYSIS OF PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GENERAL
USE OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE

Pattern Instructions for
Character Evidence
Content of Pattern
Instructions
Use character evidence to
consider likelihood that
defendant would commit a
particuar act
Use character evidence in
evaluating reasonable
doubt
Good character is not an
excuse for crime
Use character evidence in
conjunction with other
evidence
Instructions about weight
given to character
evidence
Length and Readability of
Instructions
Number of words (range)
Flesch Reading Ease
(0-100)
Average grade level
(range)

State Courts + DC
(N = 48)

Federal Circuit Courts
(N = 9)

54.2 (N =26)

77.8 (N = 7)

53.8 (14/26)

57.1 (4/7)

65.4 (17/26)

8 5 .7 (6/7)

57.7 (15/26)

0.0 (0/7)

100.0 (26/26)

100.0 (7/7)

38.5 (10/26)

42.9(3/7)

99.31 (34-201)

69.14 (27-132)

44.54 (5.0-57.6)

38.9 (26.3-45.5)

14.58 (11.6-25.1)

15.23 (12.7-19.5)

I
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TABLE 2. ANALYSIS OF PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS FOR CHARACTER
EVIDENCE CROSs-EXAMINATION

Pattern Instructions for
Cross-Examination
Content of Pattern
Instructions
Use cross-examination to
evaluate the credibility of
the character witness
Limits of use (do not use
to evaluate defendant or
guilt; not evidence)
Length and Readability of
Instructions
Number of words (range)
Flesch Reading Ease
(0-100)
Average grade level
(range)

State Courts + DC

Federal Circuit Courts

(N = 48)
18.8 (N =9)

(N =9)

100.0(9/9)

100.0(2/2)

77.8 (7/9)

100.0 (2/2)

96.33 (42-156)

109.5 (95-124)

45.23 (29.8-52.1)

42.8 (41.2-44.4)

14.59 (11.2-17.5)

13.9 (13.7-14.1)

22.2 (N=2)

